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Abstract

The problems of social and economic reform were at the center of academic and
political activities of Maksim M. Kovalevskii (1851-1916), a prominent Russian historian
and sociologist. The comparative study of rural communal institutions led him to
conclude that the village commune remained a viable social and economic institution in
late imperial Russia. Although he believed firmly in private agriculture, he criticized the
Stolypin land reform for attempting to pressure peasants to separate from communes.
Kovalevskii argued that in a country dominated by communal traditions the state must
not destroy the collective economy by legislative fiat. He urged Russian policy-makers to
support the village commune instead of destroying it and pointed to substantial evidence
of the commune’s economic potential. Recent studies have confirmed Kovalevskii’s
assertions that communal economic arrangements in the post-Emancipation Russian
village were flexible enough to allow for innovation and improvement. Kovalevskii’s
analysis challenges us to revise our understanding of rural communal institutions and of
the general dynamic of social and economic change.

iv

Introduction

Economic modernization constituted one of the pressing issues in late imperial Russia.
Agricultural development was a matter of particularly strong scholarly and practical
concern. Educated Russians of all political persuasions sought to understand the peasants
and rural institutions, passionately debated the “peasant question”, and offered various
solutions to it. All, however, agreed on the significance of the successful modernization
of the countryside to Russia's political and economic progress. Because the peasantry
comprised the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, the rapid and effective
resolution of problems of the agricultural sector came to be seen as the matter of the
survival of the entire social order. As radical political movements became increasingly
influential in Russian society, it was no longer possible to maintain social stability
without improving the economic condition of the rural population.
The problems of social and economic reform were at the center of Maksim M.
Kovalevskii's academic and political activities. He received a world-wide recognition as
the author of numerous monographs on sociology, comparative law, political science,
anthropology, and ethnography. His historical works covered a wide range of topics,
including social, political, and economic history, the history of law and family, and the
evolution of peasant institutions. Kovalevskii placed particular stress on the complex
processes of transition from traditional to modern societies in different cultures.
Influenced by positivist and liberal thought, he believed in the universal laws of historical
evolution and viewed gradual change as a key factor of progress. His analysis of the
general patterns of development of political, economic, and legal institutions led him to
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conclude that modernization could be successful only when it was based on existing
institutions and culture. Any radical break with traditional values and practices would
lead to social upheavals. Based on his scholarly findings, he warned Russian policymakers that reforms aimed at destroying traditional peasant institutions would not
improve the status quo, but would only provoke social and economic degradation and
thus discredit the very idea of reform.
Born on August 27, 1851, in a family of wealthy aristocratic landowners, he studied at
the University of Kharkov, one of Russia's best educational institutions, from 1868 to
1872. His major professor, Dmitrii I. Kachenovskii, a prominent legal historian, a liberal,
and a positivist, fostered his interest in positivist ideas and in the comparative historical
study of institutions, an interest he maintained throughout his academic career. After
graduating from the University of Kharkov, Kovalevskii continued his education as a
graduate student in Europe. In Berlin, he studied with Rudolf Gneist, Heinrich Brunner,
and Adolf Wagner. Most of the time he spent in France, where he attended lectures at the
School of Paleography and Librarianship (École des Chartes) and conducted research at
the Bibliothèque Nationale and the historical archives in Lyon, Montpellier, Rouen, and
Aix-en-Provence.1
He spent one year in England using the rich resources of the British Museum. In
London, he met Henry S. Maine and Herbert Spencer, both of whom greatly influenced
his scholarship. In England he also met Karl Marx, whose philosophy inspired him to
turn to the study of economics as a major factor in social and political change. Although

1

For an outline of Kovalevskii’s life and works, see, for example: Nikolai Ia. Kuprits, Kovalevskii
(Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1978); S.N. Pogodin, Russkaia shkola istorikov: N.I. Kareev, I.V.
Luchitskii, M.M. Kovalevskii (St. Petersburg: Izd-vo SPBGTU, 1997); and Boris G. Safronov, M.M.
Kovalevskii kak sotsiolog (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1960).
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he rejected the Marxist theory of class struggle, Kovalevskii recognized Marx as a great
scholar passionately devoted to intellectual inquiry.
After his return to Russia in 1876, his academic career advanced rapidly. He
completed his thesis, received a master's degree from the University of Moscow, and
joined the University's Department of Law as an instructor (dotsent) in comparative legal
history. Three years later, he defended his doctoral dissertation, obtained his Ph.D., and
became a full professor at the University of Moscow. His exceptional erudition and
brilliant oratorial skills made him very popular with his students. Kovalevskii never
limited himself, however, to strictly professorial activities. He published books and
regularly contributed to liberal periodicals and academic journals. In collaboration with
Vsevolod F. Miller, a famous Russian historian and ethnographer, he published and
edited the Kriticheskoe obozrenie (Critical Survey, 1879-80). He undertook three
ethnographic expeditions to the Caucasus, where he conducted extensive field work on
the culture and customs of local ethnic groups.
Kovalevskii figured prominently in the circle of Moscow liberal professors which
included Aleksandr I. Chuprov, Ivan I. Ianzhul, and Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii. After the
assassination of the Emperor Alexander II in 1881, the government declared a war on
terrorism. Increasingly suspicious of any potentially dangerous activity, the authorities
became particularly apprehensive of the situation in Russian universities, which they saw
as a major source of political radicalism. As it often happens, however, the government
victimized those who had nothing to do with terrorist activities. Despite Kovalevskii's
moderate liberal platform and strong opposition to revolution, his close association with
influential liberal leaders such as Sergei A. Muromtsev, a lawyer and a proponent of
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constitutional reform, made him a dangerous troublemaker in the eyes of the authorities.
Conservative bureaucrats, including the Minister of Education Ivan D. Delianov,
particularly disliked Kovalevskii's emphasis on the advantages of Western democratic
institutions, which implied criticism of tsarist autocracy. Accused of maintaining a
“negative attitude to the existing regime,” he was forced to resign his position in June
1887.
Kovalevskii left Russia again, this time for eighteen years. He taught at the best
European universities: Oxford University, Collège Libre des Sciences Sociales in Paris,
the Free University in Brussels, and the University of Stockholm. During two visits to the
United States, he lectured at the universities of Chicago and San Francisco. He spoke
English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish fluently, and read Latin and Greek. One of
the founders of the International Institute of Sociology in Paris, he served as its vicepresident in 1895 and as president in 1907.
While abroad, Kovalevskii produced his most influential books. To his estate in
Beaulieu in southern France, near Nice, he brought from Russia his private library of
50,000 volumes. He published extensively in the most prestigious scholarly periodicals,
including the Nouvelle revue historique de droit, the Rivista italiana di sociologia, the
Archaeological Review, and the Law Quarterly Review. Kovalevskii, however, never lost
touch with the developments in Russia. He maintained a regular correspondence with his
Russian colleagues, read books and periodicals from Russia, and continued to contribute
numerous articles to the Russian liberal press, notably the newspaper Russkie vedomosti
(Russian News) and the journals Vestnik Evropy (Herald of Europe) and Russkaia mysl'
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(Russian Thought). Many of his European publications dealt with Russian history and
economics.2
In 1901, Kovalevskii became one of the organizers of the Russian School of Social
Sciences in Paris, where he served as its director and a faculty member. The French
authorities closed the School in 1906, after persistent requests from the Russian
government, which disapproved of the teaching of “provocative” subjects to young
Russians who came to France as visitors or political refugees. In fact, most of the school's
teachers openly opposed the tsarist regime and many of its courses were unavailable in
Russian universities. Because the school's faculty consisted of only a few persons, it
relied mainly on visiting lecturers of various political persuasions. Many prominent
Russian scholars and politicians such as Pavel N. Miliukov and Sergei A. Muromtsev, the
economists Petr B. Struve and Mikhail I. Tugan-Baranovskii, and the world famous
biologists Il'ia Mechnikov and Konstantin A. Timiriazev lectured at the school. To
represent a broad spectrum of oppositional thought, Kovalevskii invited the leaders of
Russian Marxism, Vladimir I. Lenin and Georgii V. Plekhanov, to deliver a series of
lectures. After Lenin's lecture on “Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe and
Russia” in February 1903, Kovalevskii commented that Lenin “would be a good
professor of political economy if he were not so hateful of any thought different from his
own.”3

2

In addition to numerous articles, Kovalevskii published several monographs on Russia, including Modern
Customs and Ancient Laws in Russia: The Ilchester Lectures for 1889-1890 (London: David Nutt, 1891),
Le régime économique de la Russie (Paris: V. Giard & E. Briere, 1898), and Russian Political Institutions:
The Growth and Development of These Institutions from the Beginnings of Russian History to the Present
Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902).
3
Cited in Dmitry Shlapentokh, The French Revolution in Russian Intellectual Life, 1865-1905 (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 75.
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Kovalevskii returned to Russia during the Revolution of 1905. He continued his
academic career at the University of St. Petersburg, the Polytechnic Institute, and the
Psychoneurological Institute in St. Petersburg, but also engaged in political activities. In
1906, he was elected to the First State Duma (the lower chamber of the new Russian
parliament), where he represented the moderate liberal Party of Democratic Reform.
Although his party never enjoyed success among the masses, the educated public
recognized him as one of Russia's leading liberal politicians. Second in popularity only to
Pavel N. Miliukov, leader of the liberal Constitutional-Democratic (Kadet) Party, he was
known simply as Maksim Maksimovich or “our Maksim”.4
In 1907, the academic community elected him to the State Council (the upper chamber
of the parliament), where he served on many legislative committees until his death in
1916. A strong advocate of agricultural modernization, he strongly opposed the Stolypin
land reform. The summer of 1914 Kovalevskii spent in Karlsbad, then part of Austria, for
treatment of a heart condition. When the World War I broke out, the Austrian authorities
detained him as a civil prisoner but soon released him after the intervention of his
influential friends, including President Woodrow Wilson. His health declined rapidly,
however, and he died in March 1916. His funeral became a national event that attracted
tens of thousands of people in St. Petersburg. Tugan-Baranovskii considered his death the
heaviest loss for Russia since the death of Lev N. Tolstoi in 1910. The French parliament
sent a telegram to Russia mourning his death and praising his Proiskhozhdenie
sovremennoi demokratii (Origins of Contemporary Democracy) as a great contribution to
French historiography.

4

N.B. Khailova, “Maksim Maksimovich Kovalevskii,” in Rossiiskie liberaly, eds. Boris S. Itenberg and
Valentin V. Shelokhaev (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 366-370.
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Peculiarly, despite Kovalevskii's outstanding academic achievements, historians have
ignored much of his scholarship. The only monographic study about Kovalevskii, which
appeared in the 1960s, focused primarily on his sociological work and was infused with a
heavy dose of the Soviet Marxist ideology. Recovering and re-evaluating Kovalevskii's
extensive scholarship is certainly much needed, especially when it comes to his works on
peasant communes.
This study represents the first attempt to examine Kovalevskii’s writings on peasant
communal institutions in light of the evidence provided by pre-revolutionary Russian
economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians. His analysis of the family and village
commune is also discussed in the context of twentieth-century peasant studies and recent
works by Western and Russian historians and economists. Finally, the study evaluates the
significance of Kovalevskii’s scholarly findings and investigates their relevance to the
complex processes of rural modernization in Russia and other parts of the world today.

7

Chapter I. Two Types of Communes:
The Historical Evolution of the Family Commune
Using a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, Kovalevskii studied communal
forms of agriculture in different societies throughout history. He believed that the crosscultural study of the historical evolution of rural institutions would provide his
contemporaries with “positive” knowledge about the dynamics of social and economic
change and thus help them better understand current problems of agricultural
development.
Kovalevskii offered the first extensive discussion of communal life and economy in
Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia (Communal
Landholding: Causes and Consequences of Its Disintegration, 1879).5 This work
represented his initial attempt to examine the commune as a cross-cultural phenomenon,
evidence of which he found in India, Latin America, and North Africa. In later works, he
expanded his analysis to other regions of the world. Having collected ethnographic
material during field trips to the Caucasus, he described the commune as an institution
widely spread among the Dagestanians, Ossets, Pshavs, and other local populations. In a
series of monographs between 1886 and 1905, he synthesized his own extensive research
and numerous secondary sources. He concluded that the commune was a universal form
of social and economic organization that existed in various cultures around the world and
survived in many societies until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Kovalevskii distinguished between the two main types of the commune: the
patriarchal family and the village commune. Following Henry S. Maine and Lewis H.
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Kovalevskii, Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, prichiny, khod i posledstviia ego razlozheniia (Moscow: F.B.
Miller, 1879).
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Morgan, he described both types of the commune as archaic institutions, the origins of
which he traced back to prehistoric times. At the initial stage of human evolution all
property, including land, was owned collectively. In fact, no notion of property existed
until the development of settled forms of life and the subsequent emergence of
agriculture. Primitive people lived as nomadic tribes who made their living primarily by
fishing, hunting, and gathering. In the absence of individual property, everything except
clothing was owned by the entire tribe.
As settled forms of life developed, tribes gradually divided into clans, or gens: large
agnatic kin groups. Clans, in turn, separated over time into smaller groups, the so-called
extended patriarchal families consisting of three or rarely four generations of the
descendants of one common male ancestor. These patrilineal relatives, together with their
wives and children, lived under the same roof, thus comprising one big household. Most
importantly, the extended family formed an economic unit that cultivated its land
together, shared the products of its labor, and fed and clothed itself from a common stock.
The patriarchal family thus exemplified the earliest type of the commune, the family
commune.
Kovalevskii demonstrated that the so-called zadruga (association, or partnership) still
existed among some Southern Slavic peoples in the form of an extended family in the late
nineteenth century. As a living example, or a “survival,” of the archaic patriarchal family,
the zadruga had been probably the best known example of the family commune by the
time Kovalevskii began studying it. Historians and ethnographers “discovered” it in the
early nineteenth century. Vuk Karadzić, a famous Serbian scholar, mentioned the
zadruga in 1818 in his Dictionary of the Serbian language (Srpski Rječnik). In the 1850s-
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1870s, Serbian historians Valtasar Bogišić and O.M. Utesenović published their first
monographic studies of the zadruga.1 During the same period, the first studies of the
zadruga appeared in Russia. The emancipation of the serfs provoked heated debates over
the future of Russian agriculture and fostered an increased interest in peasant institutions.
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, the works of Bogišić and Utesenovič were translated
into Russian and the first major studies by Russian scholars appeared in print.6
In his discussion of the zadruga, Kovalevskii relied largely on the findings of Bogišić,
Leontovich, and Zigel', as well as on research by Friedrich S. Kraus.7 From these sources,
he found that the earliest Southern Slavic legal documents mentioned the zadruga. The
Vinodol Law of 1288, Stefan Dushan's Law Code (Zakonnik Stefana Dushana) of 1349,
and the Poljitsa Statute of 1440 spoke of the large family groups that lived together under
the leadership of the patriarch, bound by common land ownership and mutual financial
responsibilities. These records, Kovalevskii concluded, provided evidence that the
contemporary zadruga represented a survival of the archaic communal family with its
typical characteristics and functions.8
The zadruga constituted an economic unit based on collective property ownership and
joint production and consumption of goods. Its members owned land, livestock, tools,
and immovable property in common, performed all work together, and shared the
products of their labor. The family's property remained undivided even after the death of
the head of the household, although customary law gave individual members the right to
1

Valtasar Bogišić, Pravni običaji u slovena: privatno pravo (Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1867); Zbornik
sadašnjih pravnih običaja u južnih slovena (Zagreb: D. Albrecht, 1874); O. M. Utesenović, Die
Hauskommunion der Sudslaven (Vienna, 1859).
6
Fedor I. Leontovich, Drevnee khorvato-dalmatskoe zakonodatel'stvo (Odessa: Tip. G. Ul’rikha, 1868);
Fedor F. Zigel', Zakonnik Stefana Dushana (St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va Obshchestvennaia pol’za, 1872).
7
Friedrich S. Kraus, Sitte und Brauch der Sudslaven (Vienna: A. Hölder, 1885).
8
Maksim M. Kovalevskii, Rodovoi byt v nastoiashchem, nedavnem i otdalennom proshlom: opyty v oblasti
sravnitel'noi etnografii i istorii prava, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Brokgauz-Efron, 1905), vol. 1, 77-86.
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request their share of property and to separate from the commune. The entire family
assumed joint responsibility for all financial and legal obligations, for repaying debts
accumulated by the family, and for the payment of any monetary compensation for the
crimes committed by a family member against a member of another family (vira).
In accordance with such a strong emphasis on communal economy, a relative who
separated from the zadruga was automatically excluded from the group. On the other
hand, non-relatives could join the family through adoption or marriage if they agreed to
participate in the family's economic activities. Elderly people from outside the family
could also be admitted to the zadruga after they had lost all their relatives capable of
caring for them. As an act of confirmation of their membership, they usually transferred
their property to the family's common fund.9
Substantial authority in the zadruga belonged to the head of the family, domaćin
(literally, house leader), elected by all members of the zadruga. The domaćin, usually the
most capable and respectable male member, but not necessarily the oldest one, presided
over the family meetings, controlled the family funds, and acted as the family’s
representative in all outside matters, primarily in legal and commercial affairs. The
supreme authority, however, rested with the family council, the assembly of all adult
household members of both sexes. The council made all important decisions, especially
those pertaining to land cultivation, the sale and purchase of property, agricultural
produce, and instruments, financial loans, and any other actions affecting the entire
community. The council could also replace a domaćin with another one in case he acted
without its unanimous consent. The domaćica (female house leader) assisted the domaćin

9

Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia i razvitiia sem'i i sobstvennosti (St. Petersburg: Tip. Iu.N. Erlikha,
1895), 66-67.
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in the supervision of the female members of the zadruga. All adult women in the family
elected the domaćica, subject to approval by the entire family council. Most often, the
domaćin’s wife or the oldest woman in the family occupied the post. She supervised the
women’s daily work, kept the order in the house, mediated disputes, and often had a
decisive voice in marriage arrangements.10
Every member of the zadruga performed assigned work and received a share of food,
clothing, and other necessities. Most importantly, all adult family members, both men and
women, had a right to vote in the family council and to speak at council meetings. The
family council usually gathered every evening after supper. The domaćin presiding, it
discussed current matters, listened to the domaćin’s reports, and approved or disapproved
his suggestions concerning the sale of property and other financial affairs. With the
council’s sanction, any family members could leave the commune and form their separate
household. Males were allowed to seek seasonal employment elsewhere, especially
during the winter, when there was no agricultural work. In this case, they could usually
keep their supplemental income to themselves, except when training provided by the
family or at its expense made the extra earnings possible. As a rule, the family and an
individual member who was planning to leave concluded an agreement specifying the
exact part of the personal income to be given to the common family fund.
Characteristically, even when family members worked outside the family for several
years, they still retained family membership and all the benefits associated with it, such
as the right to property inheritance, economic protection, and support of the commune.11

10
11

Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 54-58; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 66-68; Rodovoi byt, 23-30.
Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 67-68; Rodovoi byt, 23-30.
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Not surprisingly, Kovalevskii paid particular attention to the patriarchal family in
Russia, abundant evidence of which he found in many regions of the country. Trained as
a legal historian, he based his understanding of the Russian family commune on his own
extensive research in Russian legal history and on numerous secondary sources, primarily
those of Russian historians and ethnographers such as Aleksandra Ia. Efimenko, Semen
V. Pakhman, and Dmitrii Ia. Samokvasov. By the late 1870s, when Kovalevskii
published his first books on communal landownership, the study of the Russian
patriarchal family had still remained at its initial stage. The earliest published description
of the extended peasant family, by Nikolai S. Stremukhov, appeared in 1829 in the
Zemledel’cheskii zhurnal (Agricultural Journal). Stremukhov, a Ukrainian gentry
landlord, noted that the odnodvortsy (single householders) and udel (appanage) peasants
often lived in large communal families, which tended to be more prosperous than small
individual households.12 August von Haxthausen offered a more detailed and vivid
depiction of the structure and practices of the Russian Familiengemeinde in his
magisterial Studies of the Interior of Russia.13 Like other observers of that period,
Haxthausen considered the large patriarchal family a uniquely Russian form of social
organization deeply rooted in the Russian tradition of collectivism and paternalism.
Almost simultaneously, a French sociologist, Frédéric LePlay, described numerous
examples of extended families in Central European Russia, in Orenburg province, and
among the Bashkirs and the Kazakhs. Unlike Haxthausen, however, LePlay regarded the

12

Mark O. Kosven, Semeinaia obshchina i patronimiia (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963), 15.
August von Haxthausen, Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die
ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands, 3 vols. (Hannover: Hahn’sche Buchhandlung, 1847). In English,
Studies on the Interior of Russia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).
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patriarchal family as an anachronistic social institution, one that retarded the economic
and social development of Russia.14
The systematic investigation of the Russian family commune began during the era of
the Great Reforms. Despite the publication of numerous specialized studies in the 1860s
and 1870s, Kovalevskii complained that Russian scholars concentrated on the
examination of the village commune but virtually ignored the existence of the family
commune. He believed that, like the Serbian zadruga, the Russian patriarchal family
represented an archaic communal institution dating back to the earliest stages of the
history of the Slavic peoples. He agreed with Fedor I. Leontovich's thesis that the old
Slavic verv’, recorded by the eleventh-century Russian code of law, Grand Prince
Iaroslav’s Russkaia Pravda, designated the family commune, not the village commune,
as some historians argued. Kovalevskii found later evidence of the family commune in
the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century tax registers (pistsovye knigi). The documents
referred to it as the hearth (pechishche), using the term as a unit of taxation. Legal
documents in the northern provinces of Russia also referred to the family commune as the
hearth-fire (ognishche), which reflected the practice of the members of the extended
family to cook food at the common hearth. In western and southern parts of Russia
members of the family communes were known as co-partners (siabry), mentioned
frequently in the Judicial Charter of Pskov (1397-1467), the Statute of Lithuania (1529),
and the Ukrainian laws of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.15
Like the zadruga, the Russian household commune included agnatic relatives,
descendants of one common forefather, living together with their spouses and children in
14

Frédéric LePlay, Les ouvrièrs européens. Études sur les travaux, la vie domestique et la condition morale
des populations ouvrières de l'Europe (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1855).
15
Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 49-53; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 66; Rodovoi byt, 35-37.
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one homestead and united by the common worship of ancestors. The number of family
members could vary from ten to fifty and even more. Most households consisted of
approximately twenty or thirty co-residing relatives: grandparents and parents, their
children and grandchildren, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, daughters-in-law
and sons-in-law. Non-relatives could also be incorporated into the family through
marriage and adoption or when a widow married a member of another family and her
children came to live with her under the roof of her new husband’s family. Like the
zadruga, the Russian patriarchal family functioned as a corporate economic organization
based on communal economic activity, collective ownership of land and other property,
and joint production and consumption of goods. Typically, all family members shared the
food prepared in a common kitchen. Participation in the daily economic activities of the
family gave an adopted person the status and full rights of the relative.16
The head of the family, or bol'shak (literally “the big man”), embodied patriarchal
authority in the family, as did the domaćin in the zadruga. The bol'shak represented the
entire family in its contacts with the outside world. He dealt with the governmental and
judicial authorities. He appeared in the court to answer the complaints against the family
and to defend its rights in case they had been violated. He was responsible for ensuring
that the family complied with the law, provided military conscripts, and paid taxes on
time. He presided over the family assembly, mediated disputes between the family
members, consulted them on marriage issues, and supervised their daily work. He acted
as a legal guardian of young orphans and sent them to school or to artisan shops to learn a
trade by which they could make a living in the future.17

16
17

Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 47, 53-54; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 65; Rodovoi byt, 38.
Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 55-58; Rodovoi byt, 38-40.
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Despite these powers, Kovalevskii stressed, the bol'shak's authority should not be
exaggerated. Unlike the Roman paterfamilias, for example, he was but the first among
equals. He had no right to make decisions on any major issues without the unanimous
consent of the family council, comprised of all adult members of the family, both male
and female. Most importantly, he could not make any major economic decisions, such as
buying or selling land or any other family property, without the approval of the council.
If some members of the family could not find work within the commune, the council
allowed them to seek employment elsewhere. The council also assisted the bol'shak in
settling disputes between the family members, including marriage issues. The council, for
instance, decided whether a young woman should accept or refuse a marriage offer and
determined the amount of the dowry.18
The fact that Kovalevskii did not limit himself to the study of the relatively wellresearched zadruga and the Russian patriarchal family added particular value to his work.
He sought to extend his analysis to a global scale and to find evidence of family
communes in various regions of the world and at different time periods. One of his most
notable scholarly achievements was the discovery of numerous instances of family
communes among the Dagestanians, Kabardinians, Ossets, Pshavs, and other small ethnic
groups, which he observed during his multiple field trips to the Caucasus. He pointed to
striking similarities between them and the zadruga and the Russian extended family. The
differences were few and minor in character. For example, the head of the Osset family
was not elected by family members, but appointed by his predecessor; and the family
council included only male adults.
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In the Indian literary epics Avesta and Rigveda Kovalevskii found evidence of ancient
forms of Indian family communes called the janmana. Early Indian legal codes (the
Manu, the Mitakshara, the Ushanas, and others) also mentioned the sapindas, a
multigenerational large family living under the same roof, owning property collectively,
and worshipping common ancestors. The sapindas was headed by the oldest male, whose
decisions had to be approved by all family members. Although the principle of indivisible
property governed their property relations, individuals could claim their portion of the
property and start a separate household upon the approval of all family members.
Personal earnings accumulated outside the commune were to be shared with the entire
family unless a person proved that he or she owed their earnings exclusively to individual
knowledge and skills.19
Drawing on a myriad of primary and secondary sources, Kovalevskii demonstrated the
existence of family communes in ancient Greece and Rome and in early Celtic,
Germanic, and Scandinavian settlements. He made a particularly valuable contribution to
the nineteenth-century debate about the evolution of communal institutions by
investigating the ancient German Hausgenossenschaft. Containing not only direct
relatives but also servants, slaves, laborers, and all those who depended on the family
economically and contributed to its daily activities, the Hausgenossenschaft united the
individuals who lived under the same roof and recognized the authority of the head of the
house. As a proof, Kovalevskii cited Julius Caesar’s reference to consaguinitates, qui una
coierunt (relatives who eat at the same table) and Tacitus’ mention of the propinquitates
(co-residing relatives).20
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Kovalevskii also demonstrated that the terms confraternitates, consortes,
consorteriae, genealogiae, and socii, often mentioned in the Allemanic, Bavarian,
Burgundian, Frankish, and Langobardian laws, all designated the same phenomenon: an
extended family composed of three or four generations of patrilineal relatives living
together and owning land and other immovable property in common. The charters of the
Lower Rhine also referred to them as cohaeredes, conparticipes et consaguinei, that is,
co-residents, co-owners, and relatives. In Southern Germany, this type of family was also
known as the Pfund. Citing the lack of any reference in the Germanic legal codes to the
right of testament and sale of land by individual owners, Kovalevskii argued that family
property customarily remained undivided after the father’s death. According to the
French coutumes (customary laws) and the German Weisthümer (written records of
customary laws), a family member could exercise the right to individual property
(Beispruchsrecht) and receive a personal allotment of land only upon the approval of
other family members. The Germanic laws also specified in great detail the joint
responsibility of the family for crimes committed by family members against the
members of other families and for the payment of monetary compensations for such
crimes.21
Kovalevskii found similar communal structures in almost every region of medieval
Europe. In Wales, the Celtic family associations, known as wele or gwely (literally
translated as “bed”), used land (common pasture and woodland) and other property
collectively. The chieftain granted a da to each adult male, usually in the form of an
allotment of cattle, which gave him the right to join in the communal ploughing of the
waste. When a man died, his da reverted to the family’s common stock. The members of
21
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the wele were also tied by the joint responsibility of paying the galanas, a monetary
compensation for a crime committed by a family member against a member of another
family. Kovalevskii’s study of the Brehon laws and Irish epic sources of the pre-conquest
period led him to conclude that the Irish term geilfines referred to groups of close agnatic
relatives who lived in undivided families under the leadership of the family patriarch.
Such groups practiced open-field agriculture, owned and worked the land collectively,
and did not partition their property even after the patriarch’s death. Like the Welsh wele,
they held joint responsibility for the payment of the ericfine as a compensation for crimes
committed by family members. Other European examples of the family commune
included the companias in Spanish Galicia and the parçonneries (coparceners) in France.
Characteristically, the French parçonneries survived until the nineteenth century. The
traditions of Galician companias remained strong in northern Spain in the early twentieth
century.22
As evidence from other parts of the world, Kovalevskii cited the ancient Mexican
calpulli and the North African Kabylian family. According to Spanish reports during the
American conquest, native Indians lived in calpulli, family communes headed by the
chief of the family. They owned the land in common and never divided the property
among their children. In North Africa, the Kabylian three-generational families lived
together, owned property in common, and shared the products of their labor.23
A detailed analysis of examples from all over the world allowed Kovalevskii to
discern the common characteristics of the family commune. Clearly, it represented a
complex, multi-functional institution that operated on multiple levels. First and most

22
23

Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 67; Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 66-68, 88; Rodovoi byt, 42-46, 63-69.
Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 84.

19

important, it functioned as an economic unit based on collective ownership of property
and joint production and consumption of goods. Second, the family commune existed as
a territorial unit, as its members typically co-resided in one homestead. In accordance
with the patrilocal residence pattern prescribed by custom, young men did not leave the
parental house upon marriage to form a separate household but continued to live in the
family together with their wives, children and grandchildren. Third, the family commune
constituted an autonomous administrative unit governed by the family council under the
leadership of the household head. Finally, the family commune served as a legal unit.
Ruled by customary law, it comprised a joint object of legal obligations. Family members
assumed joint responsibility for paying taxes, providing military recruits, and dealing
with judicial and administrative authorities. In earlier stages of development, the family
also held joint responsibility for any crimes committed by a family member against a
member of another family. As Kovalevskii showed, when a family member was
murdered, wounded, or otherwise victimized, customary law in many cultures prescribed
the payment of a monetary compensation by the family whose member had caused the
damage. After formal legal systems emerged, the head of the family appeared in the court
as representative of the entire household and signed contracts and legal documents on
behalf of it.
The importance of the economic functions of the family commune led some of
Kovalevskii's contemporaries to view it simply as a form of cooperative (artel'), thus
underestimating the kinship aspect. Kovalevskii criticized Efimenko for equating the
family commune with the cooperative and rejecting kinship as its essential component.
The fact that agnatic relatives made up the core of the commune appeared essential to
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Kovalevskii. Outsiders could join it only through marriage or adoption, that is, by
acquiring the status of a relative. Otherwise, they did not enjoy the full membership
rights. Membership in the cooperative, on the other hand, was based solely on a contract,
not on kinship ties. Accordingly, Kovalevskii dismissed Efimenko's contention that the
authority of the head of the family pertained only to managing the family economy, and
was similar to that of the chief (starosta) in the cooperative. The nature of the family
head's authority, he emphasized, was exclusively patriarchal. It derived primarily from
the status and the power of the patriarch as the chief administrator of the family
economy.24
The notion of the family commune as a universal, cross-cultural phenomenon also
distinguished Kovalevskii’s work from that of many of his colleagues. Despite the
proliferation of peasant studies in the 1870s and 1880s, such a global vision of the family
commune still appeared to many as innovative, if not revolutionary. Although the earliest
descriptions of the extended family appeared in the early nineteenth century, all of them
treated it as an exclusively local and particularistic phenomenon. Anthropological and
legal historical studies in the 1860s and 1870s gave the first impulse to comparative
studies of communal family forms across cultures. The works of Johann J. Bachofen,
John Lubbock, Lewis H. Morgan, and Edward B. Tylor provided a broad theoretical
framework for such studies.25 Among the pioneers in the newly emerging field were
Frédéric LePlay, Henry S. Maine, and Émile de Laveleye. LePlay offered a typology of
family forms and described extended family households in Russia, North Africa, southern
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France, Italy, and Spain. Maine convincingly demonstrated that the Hindu joint family,
the Slavic house community, the Irish sept or fine (mentioned in the Brehon laws), and
the communal families in the French province of Nièvre displayed the same
characteristics of “a community of kinsmen” who shared “the common dwelling” and
“common table” and practiced “the collective enjoyment of property and its
administration by an elected manager.”26
Kovalevskii belonged to the first generation of Russian historians and ethnographers
who addressed this issue. Like many of his contemporaries, he sought to investigate the
causes and potential effects of the growing disintegration of the family commune in postEmancipation Russia. His research revealed the complex social processes within the
family commune. On the one hand, collectivism and patriarchal authority permeated the
fabric of communal family life. Age and sex defined the person's status in the family
hierarchy. Women were subordinate to men, wives to their husbands, children to their
parents. The group interests prevailed over those of the individual. As a collective
institution, it promoted social cohesion and solidarity of its members, “the feeling of
mutual dependence and joint relationship without which no system of social reform can
have any chance of success.” Group work fostered the sense of mutual responsibility and
“reliance on one another.”27
On the other hand, Kovalevskii maintained, patriarchy fostered the growth of
individualistic tendencies within the family commune. The very foundations of the
patriarchal order contained the “seeds of its decline.” Submission of the individual to
patriarchal authority sooner or later led to increasing attempts on the part of family
26

Henry S. Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (London: J. Murray, 1875), 77-81, 90-91,
105-118.
27
Kovalevskii, Modern Customs, 60.

22

members to assert their individual rights. Kovalevskii cited many examples from
different societies and time periods to demonstrate that the “instinct of individualism”
always existed in the patriarchal family and exerted a huge impact on family practices,
particularly on property relations.28
In India, a country with a strong communal tradition, individualism displayed itself
very early during the era of the Brahman laws. According to the ancient Indian law code
of Manu, members of the joint family who accumulated their personal earnings outside
the family were required to contribute it entirely to the common fund. The same law, on
the other hand, granted to these individuals the privilege of receiving a larger portion of
property in case of the family division. By the fifth century B.C., individualism had made
even greater progress, which was reflected in the practice of considering the inheritance
received from the father, as well as gifts from friends, as belonging to the recipient
exclusively. Furthermore, the code of Narada stipulated that in case of property division,
individual members were entitled to full possession of any property acquired as a result
of their personal skills and expertise.29
Similar individualistic tendencies developed in the ancient Roman family. Military
booty (peculium castrense) represented the earliest form of personal property that
individuals could keep for themselves without sharing with other family members.
Gradually, personal property came to include quasi-military acquisitions (peculium quasi
castrense), that is, everything that individuals earned outside the family. In the Slavic
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zadruga, the similar practice of personal peculium gradually replaced the tradition of
sharing all personal earnings with the entire family.30
The growth of individualism, Kovalevskii noted, was particularly manifest in the
evolution of attitudes toward household divisions. Initially, the custom allowed
divisions of family property only after the death of the patriarch. Over time, however,
divisions during the patriarch's lifetime became increasingly frequent. In India, the code
of Manu recognized property divisions only approved by the patriarch, but the later code
of Narada extended the right to sanction a partition to the entire family council.
Nineteenth-century Indian courts acknowledged the right of any family member to
demand a portion of family property. Similarly, ancient German and French laws
stipulated that the head of the family had the right to decide whether or not to grant a part
of family property to his sons. The Schwabenspiegel statute of the thirteenth century was
the first to require the father to give at least two-fifths of the family property to his son if
he requested a partition.31
In Russia, family break-ups remained rare before the emancipation of the serfs in
1861. For the state, the family commune represented a convenient unit of taxation. Joint
responsibility for the payment of taxes guaranteed that taxes would be paid on time.
Because of its large size, the patriarchal family could also relatively easily provide
military recruits without a severe loss of labor force. For the gentry, the family commune
served as a well-organized unit of agricultural labor, supervised and coordinated by the
family head. Joint financial responsibility facilitated the collection of money dues. It was
precisely for this reason, Kovalevskii suggested, that even after the Emancipation the
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government and the gentry continued to discourage frequent family fissions. The law of
1886 exemplified one of the attempts on the part of the state to place restrictions on
household divisions by legitimizing only those divisions that received the approval of the
village commune.32
Despite restrictions, the process of disintegration of family communes gathered
momentum in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Kovalevskii estimated that about
two or three million household divisions took place between 1861 and 1891. In southern
and southwestern parts of Russia, this process went particularly rapidly. In his opinion,
the fertility of the black soil in these regions allowed a peasant to expect generally good
harvests and to manage the payment of taxes without his relatives' help. The “spirit of
independence” of the Ukrainian Cossacks also affected the peasant mentality in southern
areas and thus contributed to the acceleration of this process. Characteristically,
Kovalevskii never doubted the prospect that all regions of Russia would “sooner or later
follow the same path,” and the patriarchal house community would disappear in Russia,
just as it had disappeared in many parts of Europe.33
Thus, Kovalevskii insisted that the pressures of the patriarchal order did not make the
Russian peasant completely “insensible to the advantages of individualism.” Like many
of his contemporaries, he attributed the increase in household divisions after 1861 to the
growth of individualism and the decline of patriarchy. The “able and laborious” peasants
were no longer willing “to work for the idle and incapable”. They desired to abandon
“their communistic mode of life,” not fearing “the prospect of being deprived of the aid
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of the relatives.” Guided by the “spirit of personal enterprise,” they wanted “to have their
own homes and to be their own masters.”34
The dilemma many peasants increasingly faced was whether to stay in the family
commune and continue to accept their subordinate position in the patriarchal order or to
set up a separate household and try to start an independent life. Younger peasants were
most likely to have an “urge for independence,” a desire to leave the relative security of
the commune, and a willingness to take the risks of living on their own. Unmarried sons,
especially, felt the injustice of being forced to share their personal earnings with their
relatives who enjoyed “the pleasures of married life and a numerous progeny, who, on
account of their youth, were not yet able to earn anything by the work of their hands.”
Younger peasants also wished to leave the overcrowded dwellings, which were often “too
small to accommodate a large family,” and strove for living “with decency” in a separate
dwelling.35
Women, who suffered most from oppression in the patriarchal system, also often
initiated household divisions. Kovalevskii cited disputes among women as one of the
most common causes of partitions. The wives of younger sons were most likely to be
dissatisfied with their status. They occupied the lowest position in the patriarchal
hierarchy as newcomers, as women, and as spouses of junior male members of the
family. The wives of seasonal workers often desired to leave the family commune
because they felt defenseless in their husbands' absence and saw the separation as the
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only way to liberate themselves from oppression. No wonder that daughters-in-law
generally enjoyed the reputation of potentially troublesome family members.36
It was not only resistance to patriarchy that, according to Kovalevskii, turned women
into agents of individualism. Paradoxically, the patriarchal system itself promoted
women's individualism. The right of women to own individual property within the family
commune represented, in Kovalevskii's opinion, a factor that promoted “the
establishment of private property.” Young women could keep for themselves any
earnings they made during their leisure hours. These private belongings comprised the
bulk of their future dowry. Their parents contributed only but a small addition to what a
young woman accumulated by her “industry and thrift.”37
Although custom excluded women from property inheritance, widows and unmarried
daughters received upon the patriarch's death small endowments that provided for their
care until their death or marriage. Finally, women participated in family assemblies.
Their opinion, though considered less significant than that of men, did not remain
completely disregarded, especially given the influence they often exerted on their
husbands. Kovalevskii thus stressed the important role of women in shaping the family
life and economy.38
Twentieth-century studies corroborated Kovalevskii's thesis that the patriarchal family
existed in many parts of the world until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
An extensive literature on the zadruga has documented the wide spread of this type of the
family commune among the Balkan Slavs. Similarly, family historians confirmed the
existence of extended families in the Caucasus, India, and Western Europe. David I.
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Kertzer found a high proportion of complex family households in central Italy in the midnineteenth century.39 David S. Reher presented evidence of high incidence if complex
family households in northern Spain.40 John W. Shaffer described the family communes
(communauté) in the French province of Nivernais, where they survived well into the
nineteenth century.41
Testing Kovalevskii's findings on the Russian family commune against the current
state of research on this subject is particularly relevant for our purposes because it
comprised his primary interest and concern. Western historians have generally agreed
that the patriarchal family commune represented the dominant form of household
organization in medieval Russia and survived in many Russian regions until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Jerome Blum and Geroid T. Robinson, for
example, showed that throughout centuries Russian peasants lived in “complex or
patriarchal families which usually included not only the children and grandchildren of the
head of the household, but other relatives by blood and marriage.”42 Christine D.
Worobec demonstrated that the structure and culture of the Russian peasant life
dominated by the complex family displayed a marked continuity over several centuries.
Despite a significant increase in family divisions in the post-emancipation period, large
patrilocal households continued to exist in many regions. In 1887-1896, more than twothirds (67.4 percent) of peasant households in Voronezh province were composed of
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extended families. In Kostroma province, the figure stood at nearly 47 percent of all
households.43
Numerous local studies conducted with advanced statistical techniques also confirmed
Kovalevskii’s generalizations. Peter Czap, one of the leading authorities in the field of
comparative family history, concluded that “the large multi-generational
family/household was the predominant form of domestic group among [seigniorial
peasants] throughout large areas of Russia in the eighteenth and first half of the
nineteenth centuries.” In Czap’s estimate, complex family households accounted for
between 62 to 85 percent of all serf households during this period.44 A local study by
Steven L. Hoch demonstrated the existence of complex family households in Petrovskoe,
a village estate in Tambov province. According to Hoch, complex family households
made up 60 to 78 percent of the total before 1856, when a significant drop occurred.45
Edgar Melton found similarly high populations among serf households in Rastorg, a
Kursk province estate of the Sheremet’evs. Rodney D. Bohac showed that a majority of
peasant households of the Manuilovskoe estate in Tver province represented complex
family structures as well.46
In contrast, most Soviet historians believed that the simple nuclear family, not the
large patriarchal family, dominated Russian rural communities “from the sixteenth right
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up to the middle of the nineteenth century.”47 Nina A. Minenko, however, pointed to the
fact that, although the small family predominated in Western Siberia in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the sources also revealed frequent instances of large family
households, numbering twenty to thirty persons living under the authority of a patriarch
head.48 Boris N. Mironov criticized Soviet historians for tending to categorize some
complex families as nuclear and thus exaggerating the number of nuclear family units.
According to Mironov, complex family households constituted the absolute majority in
the Kiev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Perm, and Iaroslavl provinces around 1850. By the turn of
the twentieth century, the nuclear family dominated in all regions of Russia except the
central black-earth region and Belorussia.49
Thus, most of the evidence generated by twentieth-century historians strongly
supports Kovalevskii’s assertion that the patriarchal family commune represented a
widespread phenomenon in medieval and modern Russia and that it rapidly declined
during the post-Emancipation period. Like Kovalevskii, historians today focus on
explaining the dramatic increase in family divisions in the last several decades of the
nineteenth century. For the most part, they arrive at conclusions similar to those of
Kovalevskii. For example, the practice of family divisions, when each of the sons
received an equal share of all property (land, livestock, and household goods) after the
patriarch's death, is likewise interpreted not simply in terms of peasant egalitarianism but
as a function with a pragmatic economic meaning. Equal inheritance system ensured that
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no heir would be dispossessed and left without the minimum economic resources needed
for paying taxes and satisfying the basic needs of the newly formed family. By securing
the peasants from impoverishment and proletarianization, it served as a preventive
measure against the growth of landless peasant laborers, a potentially destabilizing force
in the countryside.
On the other hand, present-day peasant studies offer a much more detailed and
nuanced explanation of the process of disintegration of family communes in Russia than
was possible in the nineteenth century. For example, scholars have found that, despite the
apparent benefits of equal property distribution, peasants feared that excessively frequent
use of it might pose a potential threat to household economy. As the number of family
divisions increased during the post-Emancipation period, peasants became concerned that
partitions could create economically weak households. Many small families, in fact,
experienced a labor force shortage because they often contained only one male of
working age. Such households were extremely vulnerable to crop failure, loss of
livestock, and injury or ill health of the head the family.50
For this reason, the village commune preferred to preserve large communal families as
economically stable and viable. With their substantial human and material resources, the
patriarchal families were more likely to operate successfully and to pay rent punctually.
The village commune generally discouraged household divisions because it believed
partitions endangered the productive strength and financial stability of both the household
and the entire village. The inability of new households to survive on their own and to pay
rent placed increased economic burdens on other households in the village, not to
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mention the additional economic strains associated with the search for land on which to
build the dwellings for new families and assigning them a new plot of communal field
land.51
On the other hand, the village commune rarely denied actual requests for partitions.
Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that even after separation from the family
commune, new households remained in the village commune and continued to adhere to
communal practices. Sometimes they retained economic cooperation with the original
household, continuing to work together and even sharing barn or kiln. As part of the
village commune, the new household joined in the cooperative enterprise of its
neighbors.52
It was in the interest of the entire village community to ensure the economic viability
of each new household. During divisions, it checked whether the separating householder
received a fair share of property from the original household and left with some seed,
equipment, clothing, grain, and livestock to ease his transition. Peasants themselves
exercised great caution when it came to property division. To prevent the potential
dangers of partitions, they often preferred to postpone a partition or to limit the number of
new branches. Poorer households had an even greater interest in retaining their family
property intact, which they usually did by disinheriting members of descending
generations or by sending heirs into other households as adopted sons or in-marrying
sons-in-law.53
As we can see, communal family economy represented a carefully maintained
equilibrium between the two seemingly conflicting tactics: equal division of property on
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the one hand and preventing too frequent divisions on the other. Both strategies, in fact,
served the same economic function. They both were aimed at stabilizing economic
stratification and maintaining the productive efficiency of the household. Both
represented pragmatic responses of the peasantry to the complex social and economic
processes in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russian countryside.
The main weakness of Kovalevskii's vision of the family commune was that he
understood it exclusively in evolutionary terms. For him, it represented an archaic
institution, a dying “survival” of the past that essentially had no role to play in modern
society. As an evolutionist, he recognized the historical transformation of the patriarchal
family throughout centuries and a great variety of its forms in different parts of the world.
He demonstrated that the family commune was a dynamic phenomenon that changed
over time, despite the fact that its basic customs remained substantially unaltered
throughout centuries. Its functions and property relations were modified in response to
changing social and economic conditions. Most importantly, he showed that the
communal family changed as a result of internal processes, due to the growth of
individualism within it. Tensions between patriarchy and collectivism on the one side and
individualistic tendencies on the other were transforming its economic and legal
practices.
On the other hand, Kovalevskii failed to explain the longevity of the family commune
and its persistence into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Viewing it
merely as a remnant of “archaic communism,” he underestimated its functional
significance in a contemporary society. Although he identified the multiple functions of
the family commune, he underrated its adaptability to a changing environment, a key

33

factor that ensured its longevity. Paradoxically, the fact that the family commune still
existed in most of the non-European world, as well as in southern and eastern regions of
Europe, did not lead Kovalevskii to realize that it constituted an integral part of modern
life, not just a surviving artifact of the past stages of human development. He failed to
admit that the complex family continued to operate as an effective social and economic
institution in a contemporary society, despite a significant decrease in numbers.
Following anthropologists and ethnographers, historians today have abandoned the
vision of the family commune as a primitive “survival” of the past. It has come to be seen
as a type of family that, despite its ancient origins, continues to function effectively in
some modern societies.54 Due to its high adaptability to changing social and economic
conditions, the complex family has retained its viability in the modern world.
Kovalevskii's failure to recognize the family commune's viability is not surprising
given the fact that such views dominated scholarly discourse during his lifetime. On the
other hand, this failure presents a striking contrast with his more complex and dynamic
understanding of the other communal form, the village commune. By contrast to the
rapidly decaying family commune, the village commune displayed, according to
Kovalevskii, the signs of economic vitality and stability. Despite the fact that peasants
were willing to break up from the patriarchal family, they did not want to leave the
village commune. As a rule, emerging nuclear families did not separate from the village
commune but continued to live in it. In fact, as we have seen, family divisions did not
produce any degenerative effects on the village level. Unlike the family commune, the
village commune remained a viable institution with a significant economic potential.
54
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Chapter II. The Origins and Historical Evolution of the Village Commune

Alongside the family commune, another form of collective social and economic
organization—the village commune—developed in various parts of the world at the
earliest stages of human evolution. Whereas the family commune represented a kin-based
group composed of the members of the big patriarchal family with their spouses and
children, the village commune could include both relatives and non-relatives living on the
same territory. Because of this distinctive characteristic of the village commune,
Kovalevskii, like many scholars of his era, also referred to it as the neighborhood, or
territorial, commune.
Kovalevskii recognized that the lack of historical records made the origins of the
village commune as obscure as those of the family commune. He never doubted,
however, the ancient character of the village commune and criticized both Russian and
West European historians who insisted on its relatively recent origins. In some instances,
he suggested, village communes evolved directly from the tribal communes, similarly to
the way the family communes originated. In other cases, they appeared as a result of the
gradual dissolution of family communes and their unification into neighborhood
associations. In countries like Russia, the process of formation of family communes and
village communes took place simultaneously, thus leading to the co-existence of both
communal forms in many regions. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, the majority of Russian village communes still contained family communes, or
households composed of the members of extended patriarchal families.1

1

Kovalevskii, Ocherk proiskhozhdeniia, 143-144; Rodovoi byt, 89.

35

According to Kovalevskii, the main reason for the formation of these territorial
partnerships was the collective colonization and assimilation of new lands.55 Due to
enormous labor investment that these tasks required, especially when it came to clearing
woodlands, only the collective action of peasants living in one village or neighboring
settlements could make such operations possible. Consequently, the new lands acquired
by the joint effort of neighbors became to be considered a joint property belonging to all
those who directly or indirectly contributed to the acquisition, that is, to the entire village
community. Individual households thus received the right to cultivate their share of
communal land, but not to own or sell it at will.56
At this initial stage of the evolution of the village commune, individual plots of land
did not have to be equal in size. Peasants who had smaller landholdings did not find it
necessary to demand egalitarian measures, because the abundance of land allowed them
to acquire any amount of additional land whenever needed. At some point, however,
continuous colonization and the growth of population inevitably exhausted the land
resources. When unoccupied land was no longer available, peasants with less land, who
typically made up the majority in the village, started demanding the equalization of
communal land. The families with larger landholdings initially resisted such attempts at
land redistribution but eventually had to conform to the will of the village majority. As a
result, sporadic repartitions began to be held in order to ensure equal access to the arable
land for all households in a village. The process acquired more or less periodic frequency
over time. Periodic land repartitions, Kovalevskii concluded, did not represent an archaic
collective practice, as it was commonly thought, but appeared at a later stage of the
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evolution of the village commune in response to the growing population pressure on the
land.57
In keeping with his notion of the village commune as a universal phenomenon,
Kovalevskii presented evidence of its existence in various parts of the world and at
different time periods. Drawing on the studies by the British scholars and colonial
administrators Henry S. Maine and H. Rose, he showed that the nineteenth-century
Indian villages practiced the so-called run-rig system, holding the arable land in common
and carrying out periodic land redistributions between households. He also referred to the
findings of a Belgian expert in property relations, Émile de Laveleye, to demonstrate the
presence of similar practices in other regions, including contemporary Afghanistan and
the Dutch colony of Java.
Kovalevskii's own research on European legal and economic history led him to
conclude that peasants in Western Europe retained the common use of woodland and
pastures even after the enclosure of the arable land and meadows. The persistence of
English commons, French communaux, German Gemeinde-güter, Scandinavian
allmening, and Swiss allmenden testified to the viability of traditional communal
practices in the modern European village. For Kovalevskii, these contemporary
phenomena represented the survivals of the medieval rural communes.58
Kovalevskii devoted a great deal of attention to the study of the history of the village
commune in Western Europe. In fact, he became one of the most passionate participants
in the famous debate among nineteenth-century European scholars about the origins of
collective property relations. Contrary to his opponents’ view of the European village
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commune as a by-product of the manorial economy imposed on the rural population in
order to secure the collection of dues, he insisted that the village commune had existed
long before the emergence of serfdom and the manorial system. In opposition to
Frederick Seebohm and his followers, who argued that the manorial lords introduced the
system of collective use of communal land as part of the enserfment process, Kovalevskii
emphasized that rural seigneurs simply modified the already existing village commune in
order to appropriate it to their own needs. Previously free peasants were turned into serfs,
but their traditional collective practices were enhanced and incorporated into the manorial
system.59
To support his thesis, Kovalevskii cited numerous examples from late ancient and
early medieval European history. Building on the findings of the German historian Georg
von Maurer, he showed that the so-called Mark, or Markengenossenschaft, an association
of neighboring settlements of families that occupied and cultivated land on a collective
basis, represented an example of the Germanic village commune.60 During ancient and
early medieval times, he argued, free Teutonic peasant-warriors formed voluntary
associations in order to manage their local economic and political affairs. Through direct
assemblies, they regulated their agricultural activities and elected headmen to enforce
their decisions and to lead them in war. As serfdom and the manorial system spread
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throughout the Germanic territories during the Carolingian period, the village commune
became gradually incorporated into the new social and economic order.61
Referring to Anglo-Saxon charters and the extensive research by nineteenth-century
European scholars, Kovalevskii offered a detailed description of the medieval English
village commune. In opposition to Seebohm's contention that the rural commune
appeared in post-Norman England as part of the development of the manorial system,
Kovalevskii argued that communal practices had existed long before the Norman
conquest. Free Anglo-Saxon farmers had lived in self-governing village communities
called townships and used the arable and non-arable land in common. As the
“feudalization” of the English society progressed, seigneurs deprived the village
communes of their freedoms and converted them into manors, adjusting communal
practices to the needs of the manorial economy.
Kovalevskii’s scrupulous investigation of the Lex Salica, Lex Ripuaria, and other
early medieval legal documents, led him to postulate the existence of the village
commune among the Franks. Their concept of individual ownership, according to
Kovalevskii, applied only to movable property, houses, and gardens. The commune
owned the land, whereas individual households possessed the right to cultivate a portion
of it. Similar practices, he pointed out, existed in many other parts of Europe, including
Italy, Spain, and Russia.
Not surprisingly, Kovalevskii expressed a particular interest in the evolution of the
Russian village commune. Like Pavel G. Vinogradov and other Russian students of
medieval European history, he confessed that one of the main reasons he devoted so
much attention to exploring communal forms worldwide was his conviction that his
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findings could apply to Russia and could thus help him better understand the origins and
character of the Russian village commune. In his Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of
Russia, Kovalevskii offered the most detailed exposition of his theory of the evolution of
the Russian village commune. As his discussion demonstrated, the historical development
of the Russian village commune indeed resembled that of its counterparts in Western
Europe and other regions of the world.
Citing the earliest references to the village commune in the sixteenth and seventeenthcentury Russian charters, Kovalevskii concluded that by this time many small settlements
consisting of a few households had united with neighboring settlements into the so-called
canton (volost') communes similar to the medieval German Mark. At this initial stage of
the evolution of the village commune, each household continued to own and cultivate its
arable land individually. The same usually applied to the use of the meadow land.
Pastures and woodland, on the other hand, were owned by the entire volost' commune.
“No one had the right to clear the forest or reclaim the wasteland lying within the limits
of a volost', unless authorized to do so by the elders and the assembly of peasants.”62
Most importantly, during this period Russian volost' communes, like their counterparts
in medieval England and Germany, did not enforce egalitarian measures, which was
clearly reflected in the charters repeatedly mentioning the “best men” and “the men of
wealth” (zhitii liudi) side by side with the “smaller men” (molodshie liudi). The size of an
individual plot of land, as well as the economic standing of a household, could differ
significantly from those of other households in a volost'. In matters of taxation,
egalitarianism was similarly unknown. Communes did not distribute tax burdens equally
among its household members, nor did they bear collective responsibility for the payment
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of taxes. Each household paid its share of the land tax determined by the amount of land
it owned.63
Significant changes in communal practices started taking place with the emergence of
serfdom and the “manorial” economy in sixteenth-century Russia. The most dramatic
change involved the extension of collective ownership and cultivation rights to the arable
land and meadows. In exchange for dues (obrok) or agricultural labor (barshchina)
received by the landlord, each peasant household received the right to cultivate its share
of the village land. Deprived of land-ownership rights they had possessed before,
individual peasants now became enserfed tenants on the lord's land. In addition to
manorial obligations, they continued to pay the land tax to the state. Since collecting the
state tax was the entire village's prerogative, it made perfect economic sense to place the
customary village land under communal authority and give the commune an exclusive
right to distribute land among its members. The collectivization of the arable land thus
benefited both the peasant serfs, who now had access to at least a minimum amount of
land that could guarantee them subsistence and a sufficient income to meet their financial
obligations, and the elites, who viewed the communal system as an effective means of
securing the payment of taxes and manorial dues by each household.64
Communes did not yet enforce egalitarian measures at this stage of development. The
amount of land households could receive for cultivation varied greatly, and so did their
tax payments and manorial duties as they both depended on the size of a family's land
allotment. The relative abundance of land, as well as the right of Russian serfs to leave
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their current landlord and to resettle in another manor, allowed peasants to migrate in
search of better lands without becoming discontented with the existing allotments.65
Further changes in communal organization occurred when, as a result of the growing
population pressure, arable land became increasingly scarce. The state responded to this
tendency by changing the taxation system. In 1719, Peter the Great replaced the land tax
with the poll tax, or the “capitation” tax. When, due to limited land resources, the
taxation system based on the amount of cultivated land could no longer serve as a stable
source of revenue, the state decided to secure a flow of money by taxing each household
according to the number of people in a household. Furthermore, in order to ensure the full
and regular payment of the new tax, the state enforced the principle of mutual fiscal
responsibility of the entire village and abolished the peasant serfs' right to free migration.
Unable to leave their current residence and confronted with new fiscal obligations,
communal peasants realized the inadequacy of the previous practice of land distribution,
which allowed for inequalities between households, and started equalizing their land
holdings by adjusting the size of each allotment to the number of people in a household
that farmed it. This measure made perfect sense in the context of the new poll tax of Peter
the Great, which fell on all household members. To ensure that the amount of land each
family cultivated corresponded to changes in its composition over time, communes held
periodic land redistributions, at least every nineteen years after an official tax revision, or
even more frequently if needed.
State authorities and landlords welcomed these peasant initiatives. Kovalevskii even
mentioned several instances when provincial governors and gentry landowners enforced
the practice of equal land distribution among local peasants. Clearly, the principles of
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egalitarianism and periodic repartition served the interests of the ruling elite by providing
them with a guarantee of peasants' fulfillment of their financial obligations.
By no means, of course, could Kovalevskii be credited with the “discovery” of the
Russian village commune. By the time he published his first books and articles about the
commune, it had become a widely researched and hotly debated issue. Andrei T. Bolotov
and other Russian economists in the eighteenth century debated the advantages and
disadvantages of communal farming. The issue became a matter of particular intellectual
interest in the 1840s and 1850s, when both the government and the educated elite realized
the urgency of rural reform. The public debate over the abolition of serfdom and the fate
of the peasant commune turned these academic and bureaucratic discussions into one of
the most heated controversies in Russian history. The numerous publications of the
Slavophiles and particularly the appearance of the book by the German observer, Baron
August von Haxthausen, provoked an active response from both their enthusiastic
supporters and equally enthusiastic critics. Another strong stimulus came from the
influential liberal thinker and politician Boris N. Chicherin, who in 1856 published his
famous article about the origins of the Russian village commune. Chicherin's attack on
the Slavophile vision of the commune provoked a series of monographic studies that
defended Chicherin's theory or attempted to refute it. Finally, the Emancipation Statute of
1861, which freed Russian peasants from serfdom but retained and even strengthened the
power of the village commune, provoked another wave of disputes and arguments. Over
3,000 books and articles on the subject appeared during the last three decades of the
nineteenth century.
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Despite such enormous numbers of monographic studies on the topic, Kovalevskii's
writings became recognized as a remarkable contribution to a better understanding of the
Russian peasant commune. His readers both in Russia and abroad respected him as one of
the most ardent critics of the Slavophile and populist writers, who considered the village
commune a uniquely Russian phenomenon that allegedly exemplified the innate nature of
peasant collectivism and egalitarianism and could thus serve as a safeguard against the
purported evils of European capitalism and individualism.
Kovalevskii ridiculed such views of the commune as idealistic and unsupported by
historical evidence. He emphasized the universal character of the village commune and
pointed to its existence in different societies and at different time periods. Moreover, he
insisted that, despite its collective and egalitarian aspects, the village commune did not
entirely stifle peasant individualism and initiative. Most importantly, collective and
egalitarian practices themselves evolved not because of the collectivist instincts allegedly
inherent in Russian peasant mentality, but as a pragmatic response to the pressures of
Russia's climate, environmental conditions, and the ever-increasing financial demands of
the state and gentry.
At the same time, Kovalevskii criticized the simplex explanations of the evolution of
the village commune advanced by Chicherin, a prominent historian of the so-called state
school, who, like Seebohm, stressed the principal role of the government in the
emergence of the village commune. According to Chicherin, the state simply invented the
commune as a collective agency to facilitate tax collection. Chicherin denied the ancient
origins of the village commune and insisted on its relatively recent appearance due to the
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government's policy to bind the peasants to their place of residence so no one could
escape the tax.
Kovalevskii argued that Chicherin had distorted the past by focusing exclusively on
the role of the state and ignoring other factors. Unlike Chicherin, he emphasized the equal
significance of demographic, environmental, and economic factors in the evolution of the
village commune. Only multi-causal explanations, in his view, could adequately explain
both the historical continuity of the commune and the changes it underwent at different
stages of its development. As an evolutionist, he regarded the commune as a product of
the natural evolution of peasant practices, not simply a fiscal device imposed by the state.
Communal forms, he insisted, had evolved long before the state decided to appropriate
them to its needs. Nor did they remain static, as Chicherin suggested, but changed over
time in response to changing demographic, economic, and political conditions.
It remained to explain the disappearance of communal forms in some countries and
their continued existence in others. A firm believer in the positivist idea of progress,
Kovalevskii never doubted that, in accordance with the universal laws of history,
communal agriculture would inevitably decline and give way to individual farming.
Generally, this process would take place over a few centuries, although he admitted that
the sequence of change could vary widely in regions as diverse as Western Europe,
Russia, India, Africa, and Latin America.
Kovalevskii attributed particular importance to the demographic factor in the
dissolution of communes worldwide. The growth of population, in his opinion, put
increasing pressure on the village commune by aggravating land shortage. Inevitably, as
new settlers continued to arrive in villages, diminishing land resources prompted
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commune members, who used to be more tolerant toward newcomers claiming common
rights, to became more reluctant to accept them. Gradually, the village commune became
a sort of a closed corporation where new rural immigrants, denied the right to use the
common land and pasture, remained virtually landless. This situation caused growing
tensions between old and new members of the commune and often led to the
disintegration of many village communes.66
If commune members were victorious in the struggle with landless newcomers, the
commune would continue to exist as a closed corporation, where immigrants were
allowed to reside in the village but could not claim their rights to communal land. The socalled partecipanza in the Italian provinces of Emilia and Romagna represented an
example of a closed village commune that did not extend communal land privileges to
new immigrants.67
More frequently, however, the growing numbers of landless rural elements forced the
village commune to abandon the practice of common use of arable land and adopt
individual (podvornoe) land ownership. Commune members feared that their landless
fellow villagers would exercise the right to vote and take advantage of their majority at
village assembly meetings to gain access to arable lands. To prevent this, communes
preferred to allow its member households to own a plot of land individually, still
retaining the practice of collective use of woodland and pastures. As an example of such
transformation, Kovalevskii referred to the surviving practice of common use of pastures
and meadows in some parts of nineteenth-century Europe, including Swiss mountain
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villages called Allmenden. If Swiss peasants had a chance to migrate to other regions
where land was still available, he noted, they would still hold their land in common and
practice periodic repartitions.68
In Russia, the growth of a landless peasantry did not occur because peasants could
migrate and resettle on lands abundantly available in northern European Russia and
Siberia. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a rural proletariat did
begin to emerge in the Russian countryside. According to the Emancipation statute of
1861, certain categories of ex-serfs such as personal servants (dvorovye liudi or kholopy),
who had typically resided in the landlord's house rather than in the village, received very
small plots of land or none at all. Peasants who had fallen in debt or systematically failed
to pay taxes (nedoimshchiki) could also lose their land. Their property could be sold to
wealthier villagers, or their land might be redistributed to a more successful family.
Often, indebted peasants themselves sold their property or rented their lands to other
families in order to prevent confiscation. Finally, ex-soldiers who had been absent for a
long time and new settlers had very meager chances to receive any land. These categories
of impoverished peasants lived in the village side by side with the commune members,
participating in the village assembly meetings but lacking the economic privileges that
commune members would normally enjoy.69
Kovalevskii regarded these tendencies as a serious threat to the very existence of the
commune. At any point, landless peasants could demand their share of arable land. It
came as no surprise to Kovalevskii that communal peasants in Russia, like their Western
European counterparts, increasingly accepted the possibility of reforming communal
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practices, so that individual household members of the commune would gain the
unalienable right to use and inherit arable land plots, while retaining the common rights
to pasture and woodland. It was important, in Kovalevskii's opinion, to encourage
peasants to migrate to Siberia and less populated parts of European Russia in order to
prevent or at least minimize peasant landlessness and potential social tensions in the
countryside. Intensive industrialization and urbanization could also contribute to the
resolution of the problem by absorbing the increasing masses of rural proletariat and
providing them with employment in the factories and small businesses.70
These measures, of course, could only retard the process of the dissolution of the
village commune, not prevent it. Unlike the Slavophiles and populists, Kovalevskii did
not believe in the possibility of avoiding the decay and disintegration of the commune.
As a convinced positivist, he never doubted that the universal laws of historical progress
and evolution would inevitably replace communal institutions with more advanced forms:
individual farming and private ownership. How to avoid the devastating social and
economic consequences of drastic changes in the rural economy and peasant land
arrangements? This complex issue caused heated debates both in Russia and abroad.71
In addition to the demographic factor, economic processes also weakened the village
commune. Kovalevskii recognized that the rapid spread of capitalism caused private
agriculture to become predominant in Western Europe earlier than in other parts of the
world. The expansion of commerce and markets led to fundamental changes in rural land
arrangements. Growing population density also fostered agricultural transformations by
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increasing the demand for land, thereby raising land prices. Land became increasingly to
be seen as a commodity that could be bought and sold for profit.72
In England and other parts of Europe, these processes led to the disappearance of
common fields and massive enclosures of land. To obtain higher profits by renting land
rather than by collecting dues from serfs, landlords released the communal peasants from
manorial dues. Deprived of the right to own a piece of communal land, peasants became
free tenants, who now rented land from the landlord. Capitalist agriculture thus replaced
the manorial economy, of which the village commune was a part.73
Another strong stimulus for the destruction of common fields came from the growth of
towns. Towns offered large markets for farm products. Increased food prices fostered the
re-orientation of predominantly subsistence-based communal agriculture to commercial
farming, in which production of crops and livestock for sale directed the decisions of
farmers. Communes came to be seen as lacking economic flexibility that the market
economy required. Enclosed farms, on the other hand, appeared to be more conducive to
agricultural intensification and specialization, as well as more receptive to market
demands. Also, urban industries provided extensive employment opportunities, which
encouraged poorer peasants to withdraw from agriculture. At the same time, the urban
bourgeoisie invested capital in land and thus created additional incentives for enclosure.
The commercialization of agriculture, Kovalevskii concluded, formed part of the
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fundamental process of economic improvement and rationalization in the context of
population growth and the development of capitalism.74
Despite the significance of external factors, Kovalevskii attributed the key role in
gradual decline of the village commune to internal processes. His comparative economic
studies provided him with compelling evidence of the growth of individualism within the
commune. The most enterprising peasants, who took advantage of new commercial
opportunities and accumulated wealth, eventually viewed their membership in the
commune as an obstacle to further enrichment. Economic differentiation in the village
weakened communal ties and intensified internal conflicts between wealthier and poorer
peasants. “Everywhere the change from common to private property is brought about by
the same phenomenon one encounters the world over—the conflict of interests.”75
Even as Kovalevskii recognized the growth of individualism in the post-Emancipation
Russian countryside, manifested by the increasing frequency of family repartitions and
the dissolution of extended patriarchal families, he sought to determine the extent to
which the Russian village commune still remained a viable social and economic
institution. For this purpose, he undertook a careful investigation of statistical data, field
observations, and cross-cultural historical comparisons. Just as he opposed the populist
and Slavophile exaggeration of the virtues of the village commune as a social and
economic organization, so he questioned the widespread belief that the commune
represented an economically outmoded institution that must be replaced by private
farming as soon as possible. Both the idealistic defense of the village commune and its
unconditional condemnation appeared to him to be unscientific and abstract.
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Kovalevskii's own research, as well as studies by Russian economists, agronomists,
and zemstvo statisticians, provided him with abundant evidence that, unlike the family
commune, the village commune remained a viable institution in most regions of Russia.
Predictions of its rapid decay appeared premature and poorly documented. In the turn-ofthe-century Russian village commune, Kovalevskii wrote, collective and individualistic
practices not only co-existed peacefully but complemented each other in various ways.
Most importantly, due to its adaptability, the Russian peasant commune possessed a
significant economic potential that allowed it to survive rapid change and to contribute to
rural progress. He viewed communal peasants as capable of productive and profitable
labor. Insisting on the compatibility of the communal system with agricultural
innovation, he argued that advanced technology and farming methods could be
successfully assimilated into communal practices. The rural economy, in his opinion,
could thus advance without the destruction of the commune.
Kovalevskii found historical precedents in Europe demonstrating that communal
forms did not necessarily present an obstacle to economic improvement and the
expansion of the capitalist economy. In late medieval Italy, for example, the so-called
partecipanza in the regions of Emilia and Romagna demonstrated the capacity of the
commune to adapt to the changing socioeconomic conditions associated with the
development of capitalism. In fact, criticizing the excesses of the Stolypin land reform, he
referred to the Italian partecipanza as an example of a potential path of development of
the Russian village commune.76
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Chapter III. The Economic Viability of the Late NineteenthEarly Twentieth-Century Russian Village Commune:
Kovalevskii's Argument in Historical Perspective
Kovalevskii's argument for the compatibility of communal practices with economic
innovation deserves a detailed examination in light of evidence generated by both his
contemporaries and recent scholars. Assertions that communal land ownership did not
necessarily impede rural progress commonly encountered a great deal of skepticism in
the last few decades of the tsarist period. Today, debates over land privatization cause
just as much controversy as they did a century ago.
Russian economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians gathered much evidence
testifying to the economic potential of the village commune. For the most part, these
materials were either ignored or dismissed as containing a strong “populist” bias. Quite
understandably, opponents of the commune in the tsarist bureaucracy and the liberal and
Marxist intelligentsia remained unconvinced by the statistical data and economic analyses
that challenged the very foundations of their political and economic programs. For them,
the communal system represented not merely an outmoded and backward economic
institution, but a persistent and dangerous phenomenon that plagued Russian peasant
culture and prevented peasants from improvement and rational behavior. Traditional
defenders of the commune, who agreed with the zemstvo's appreciation of the commune's
economic capacity, did so primarily for political reasons as well, readily accepting the
supporting evidence for their preconceived ideological constructs. For both the ardent
critics and supporters of the commune, it represented an ideological phantom, with either
negative or positive connotations but equally distant from the complex realities of the
Russian village life.
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Kovalevskii studied the village commune with no intention to defend or oppose it. As
a historian and sociologist, he sought to understand the real state of affairs in the
countryside. Inevitably, his optimistic assessment of the economic potential of the
Russian village commune clashed with the prevailing opinions about communal practices
among many of his contemporaries. Since the Enlightenment, collective ownership and
economy had been traditionally identified as backward and stagnant. Intellectuals both in
Europe and Russia commonly condemned peasants as indifferent to agricultural
improvement and saw village communes as “medieval” obstacles to progress.
The French Physiocrats set the stage for the negative assumptions about communal
practices as inefficient and incompatible with the productive use of land. Quesnay,
Roubaud, and Turgot unconditionally admired English-style enclosures and endorsed the
replacement of peasant communes by large private farms. Nineteenth-century positivist
historians such as Frederic Seebohm and Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges likewise
stressed the historical primacy of private property, depicting the medieval commune as a
repressive institution imposed by rulers as a “feudal” constraint upon individual freedom
of action and economic initiative. According to Seebohm, communal practices
disappeared in England because of their incompatibility with the productive economic
behavior characteristic of the modern age.77
Karl Marx and his followers similarly portrayed peasants as wretched savages with no
discernable values or culture who lived in villages that resembled a “sack of potatoes”
more than a community. Despite his faith in social justice, Marx found nothing positive
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in rural social relations. Having never researched the peasant economy, he categorized
village communes as prehistoric and believed that only capitalism could encourage
rational economic behavior among peasants.78
Russian economists likewise excluded communal peasants from their projects of
agricultural improvement. In the eighteenth-century, such diverse thinkers as Ivan T.
Pososhkov, Vasilii N. Tatishchev, and Mikhail V. Lomonosov described peasants as idle
and apathetic. The agronomist Andrei T. Bolotov considered peasants too stubborn and
ignorant to recognize the technological advantages of individual farming.79 Some postEmancipation observers of the commune like Skaldin (F.P. Elenev) and Gleb I. Uspenskii
perceived apathy and lack of incentive as defining features of communal village life.
Without any systematic evidence, they generalized their observations of some of the most
poverty-stricken villages to the entire rural population.80
Nineteenth-century Russian Marxists accepted this notion of the peasants’ inherent
backwardness. Georgii V. Plekhanov, for example, referred to Russian peasants as
“barbarian tillers of the soil,” incapable of the efficient use of technology and unreceptive
to modern production methods. Communal peasants, in his description, failed to grasp the
advantages of private land ownership even after explanations had been repeated to them
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“ten times over in ten different ways.” Their “Asiatic” apathy and ignorance allegedly
prevented peasants from becoming individual farmers.81
Inspired by both the positivist belief in science and a romantic faith in the civilizing
mission of capitalism, liberal thinkers blamed communal institutions and practices for
retarding Russia’s economic growth and preventing the nation from becoming a modern,
prosperous, and stable society. The liberal economists Ivan V. Vernadskii, I.I.
Sreznevskii, and D. Strukov blamed the commune for retaining outmoded and
unproductive field systems and for discouraging peasants from the use of advanced field
systems, improved tools, and fertilizers.82 Boris N. Chicherin, the liberal historian,
denounced the Russian land commune as a “social monstrosity” that allegedly suppressed
all economic incentives for improvement.83 Petr B. Struve, a leading economist, insisted
that the “backward” system of communal “natural economy” must give way to private
property relations. He ridiculed any attempts to defend “medieval” communal institutions
as reactionary, sentimental, and unscientific.84
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Dmitrii A. Stolypin, an uncle of the future leader of the land reform Petr A. Stolypin
and chairman of the Moscow Agricultural Society, published numerous anti-communal
books and pamphlets. On the basis of an explicitly positivist (and allegedly “scientific”)
analysis of the rural land system in Russia, he concluded that the peasant commune
represented a stagnant relic of the medieval past, incompatible with progress and modern
economic standards. He insisted that the solution to rural Russia's problems lay in the
introduction of English-style private farming.85
By the end of the nineteenth century, non-populist Russian intellectuals and
government officials had concluded that that the peasant commune had outlived its
usefulness and represented the key obstacle to Russia’s agricultural advance and overall
economic growth. The paradox was that such exclusively negative—and presumably
“scientific”—views of the peasant commune were in fact based predominantly on
cultural assumptions about the superiority of private ownership over communal tenure
rather than on empirical studies of rural life. Moreover, they deliberately ignored some
significant features of the communal economy and avoided the evidence of the
commune’s flexibility and capacity to change. Poorly informed about the complex
realities of village life, the critics of the commune confidently denied the ability of
communal peasants to innovate and improve.86
In the 1840s and 1850s, some intellectuals questioned the classical liberal notion of
the unconditional superiority of the private land system and stressed the necessity of
researching the Russian peasant commune instead of arrogantly dismissing it as
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backward. From a romantic socialist perspective, Aleksandr I. Herzen strongly criticized
both Western European and Russian economists and historians for their cultural
arrogance toward allegedly “backward” peasant societies.87 Konstantin D. Kavelin, a
legal historian and the president of the Free Economic Society after 1861, became the
first liberal Westernizer to challenge the conventional liberal contempt for communal
practices and to call for a more balanced vision of the Russian village commune. Kavelin
strongly disagreed with Chicherin's identification as “irrational” any peasant actions that
did not conform to the classical liberal ideal of the “economic man.” 88
The most enthusiastic revisionist impulse came from the Slavophiles, who protested
against the elitist attitudes of Russian Westernizers toward the peasantry and their
institutions as based on abstract economic theories rather than on empirical investigations
of the realities of peasant culture. As romantic nationalists, the Slavophiles pointed to the
urgent need for systematic studies of Russia’s rural life and economy.89
Ludwig V. Tengoborskii, a Polish economist, published one of the first studies of the
Russian commune based on fresh statistical data. In his three-volume work entitled
Commentaries on the Productive Forces in Russia, Tengoborskii cited evidence that
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communal agriculture was indeed compatible with economic growth, even under
serfdom, as peasants introduced new crops into their field systems and strove to employ
the most productive farming techniques available to them. Tengoborskii described the
communal peasants’ economic behavior as being flexible and occasionally innovative
rather than rigid and conservative.90
Aleksandr I. Chuprov, one of the leading Russian economists and Kovalevskii's close
friend and associate, recognized the scarcity of empirical knowledge about rural life and
emphasized the need for systematic empirical studies in order to assess the economic
potential of the Russian village commune. A student of Wilhelm Roscher and Ivan K.
Babst, who translated into Russian the works of the leaders of the German “historical
school,” Chuprov became one the most enthusiastic and widely recognized initiators of
the zemstvo statistical investigations of the Russian countryside in the 1870s-1890s. By
the turn of the century, zemstvo statisticians had interviewed over 4.5 million peasant
households and created the world's largest database on peasants.91
Today, a century after Kovalevskii and his contemporaries debated the issue of the
commune's flexibility and compatibility with agricultural progress, strictly negativistic
conceptions of the Russian peasant commune continue to dominate scholarly discourse.
Historians continue to argue that village communes in imperial Russia “acted as a
powerful brake on the rationalization of agriculture” and that the “institutional structure
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of the repartitional commune made it impossible to improve the technical level of peasant
agriculture.”92
The three-field system represented the most strongly criticized aspect of traditional
communal agriculture. Opponents blamed it for multiple drawbacks, but the most
common allegation was that it wasted one-third of the arable land by leaving it fallow.
Many agricultural specialists also stressed its inefficiency in producing summer and
winter fodder resources. The majority of educated Russians regarded the three-field
system as a primitive survival of the past incompatible with progress and innovation. In
seeking to explain its backwardness, they pointed to the tremendous increases in yields
and labor productivity in Northern and Western Europe, where more intensive and
industrialized farming regimes had replaced the three-field system by the end of the
nineteenth century.
Strip cultivation became commonly associated with excessive fragmentation and
scattering of land holdings. Although the situation varied greatly from region to region,
zemstvo censuses and government surveys, in fact, revealed disturbing conditions in
many parts of European Russia, particularly in the provinces of the mixed forest belt. In
Tver province, for example, peasant households in more than half the communes held
their lands in forty or more separate strips. In extreme cases, a household might have up
to a hundred strips. In Riazan province, one of the most affected by fragmentation,
surveyors found communes with 110 strips per household, although in other Riazan
communes a typical family held only four or five strips. In the central black-earth region,
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fragmentation was not as severe. In Tambov province, the average number of strips
varied from twenty-eight in the north, to sixteen in the center, and only fourteen in the
south. Three to six strips per household were quite common in Tambov’s southern
areas.93
Extreme land fragmentation was caused by the practice of not only dividing all the
arable land into three fields but further dividing each field into sections, or furlongs (kony
or iarusy) according to soil quality, the lay of the land, and the distance from the village.
The more complicated the landscape, the more strips each field could contain. Every
household member of the commune received a certain number of long and narrow strips
(polosy, nadely, or delianki) scattered throughout various sections in each of the three
fields. Not only did multiple strips held by commune members intermix with one another,
but communal lands could also intermingle with privately-owned lands within one village
or even with the lands belonging to neighboring communes.94
One of the most troublesome effects of land fragmentation was the progressive
thinning of individual strips. In Voronezh, the average width of strips equaled
approximately to five sazheni, while the thinnest strips tended to be only one or two
sazheni wide. In Tambov province, the typical land strip could be as narrow as two or
three arshiny (approximately two yards) and the strips wider than two sazheni were
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considered “thick” (tolstiachki). In communes most affected by fragmentation, each land
parcel rarely exceeded one-fifth of a desiatina (half an acre).95
Extreme parcelization was believed to waste substantial amounts of land in boundary
furrows, verges, and headlands. Indeed, the thinner the strips, the more land was lost to
borders. Zemstvo statisticians calculated that a household with thirty-three strips would
lose 2.5 percent of the arable land in boundary furrows. In David Kerans's estimate, a
strip 4.6 sazheni wide (about ten yards) would forfeit 5.6 percent of the land to the
furrows on its borders. According to an official study in the 1920s, borders between
multiple strips consumed about 7 percent of the entire arable land in Russia.96
Critics also blamed multiple strips for causing significant time losses in transit from
strip to strip, which could be a pressing issue during tilling and harvest seasons, when
peasants worked with exhaustive intensity under heavy time constraints. Peasants
frequently neglected or even abandoned their most distant parcels. The intermingling of
strips was believed to provoke disputes between neighbors in cases of compaction by
trampling or furrow stealing. Among the most economically deleterious “neighborhood
effects” was contamination of contiguous fields with weeds. Untended borders between
strips might become breeding grounds for weeds and pests that could infect adjacent
areas of the arable land and decrease their productivity.97
Most importantly, holding land in strips, critics argued, prevented peasants from
innovation and experimentation. Unsuitable for wheeled plows and advanced agricultural
machines, excessively narrow strips restricted peasants to the use of the sokha and other
traditional tools. The intermingling of strips allegedly compelled peasants to synchronize
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the execution of the major farming operations like the sowing and harvesting of crops and
even to sow the same type of crops within each large field. It has been argued, for
example, that the communal practice of collective herd grazing required all its members
to open their arable land after harvesting to the neighbors' livestock and thus put at risk
those families who did not comply with the commune’s cultivation schedule. Not only
could foraging livestock consume the crops if a family failed to collect them on time, but
the same could happen if a strip owner sowed a late-ripening crop like corn among early
ripening grains like oats growing on adjacent strips. Another disincentive to diversify
crop selections allegedly stemmed from the peasant practice of the broadcast sowing of
seeds. Peasants feared the potentially harmful effects of the spraying of unlike crop seeds
onto neighboring strips, and so chose to grow a single crop.98
The practice of periodic land repartitions was blamed for promoting primitive
egalitarianism, which they believed discouraged peasants from improvements. Frequent
repartitions, they argued, aggravated the negative effects of strip farming by making land
holdings even thinner and more scattered with the following redistribution. They ignored
the well-known fact that non-repartitional communes suffered from land fragmentation as
much as did those that repartitioned their lands. Moreover, in villages with predominantly
hereditary tenure, land fragmentation progressed just as rapidly. Repartitions were also
commonly cited as one of the main causes of poor husbandry and soil degradation.
Reassigning land to a different household at the next repartition allegedly reduced
incentives to improve farming methods and soil quality.
Critics of the commune system overlooked an important fact that the agricultural
advancements in Belgium, Denmark, England, Germany, and Holland, had taken place in
98
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very different socioeconomic and geographical contexts. The three-field system persisted
well into the twentieth century in Russia, as well as in many other parts of the world
because it suited countries where land was plentiful. Not only communal peasants, but
also many private landowners used it. Throughout centuries, peasants have used
extensive tillage regimes in areas with a relative abundance of land. American farmers,
for example, employed the system in parts of the Midwest until the early twentieth
century. As historians of agriculture have demonstrated, intensive tillage systems without
fallow appeared first in the Low Countries and eastern England, where land was in such
short supply that it was reclaimed from the sea or the fens.99
Generations of experience have proven the system's appropriateness for Russia’s
climatic and environmental conditions, particularly for the non-black-earth regions. In
Russia’s northern latitude, late harvests left insufficient time to prepare the soil for
sowing winter crops after harvesting. It thus made perfect sense to insert a year between
spring and winter crops so that the soil could regain moisture and fertility by absorbing
nitrogen from the air and organic matter from the manure spread on the field. Fallowing
also allowed peasants to control weeds by plowing and harrowing the field several
times.100
Similarly, European Russia’s long winters and short growing season determined the
sequential combination of crops in the three-course rotation. Frost-resistant grains like
rye represented the most commonly used winter crop to be sown in a previously fallow
land, whereas fast-ripening grains—oats, barley, or buckwheat—comprised the typical
99
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spring crops. In the southern black-earth provinces, favored by a longer frost-free period
and more fertile soil, winter and spring wheat could replace the hardier grains. Various
combinations of crops used in the rotation cycle stood in a delicate balance relative to
each other.101
Significantly, the three-field system worked well with another important aspect of the
peasant economy, animal husbandry. Peasants allowed natural vegetation to grow in the
fallow and used it for pasturing their livestock before other sources of fodder, such as hay
and crop stubble, were available. Herds, in turn, were believed to improve the fallow soil
by eating and trampling down the weeds growing there. More importantly, livestock
produced organic fertilizer for the fields and provided draught power for sokhi, plows,
and other agricultural tools.102
The notion that peasants adhered to strip cultivation because of their strong egalitarian
sentiments appears erroneous. Communal peasants themselves justified the strip system
primarily in economic terms, seeing in the proliferation of strips an effective protection
against the risk of the loss of harvest due to damages caused by hailstorm, drought, pests,
fire, or livestock trampling. From generations of experience, peasants knew that harvests
could vary dramatically from area to area in the open fields. Because of the different
quality and fertility of the soil, some parts of the village lands could be more productive
than others. Micro-climates and landscapes might also vary to the extent that some
sections of the fields were likely to be more exposed than others. Damage caused by birds
and insects, or livestock trampling could affect a portion of a field. All these factors made
a family with a single plot of land in one area much more vulnerable to weather
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fluctuations and other risks than a family with many strips scattered around open fields.
Strip farming allowed all households in the commune to share potential risks and to
ensure their subsistence by collecting at least a minimum harvest.103
Zemstvo experts documented the economic rationality of strip cultivation as a riskaversion mechanism. In the 1890s, Vasilii V. Vorontsov, for example, quoted peasants
who explained the use of land scattering as a guarantee of an “even” harvest in the areas
where localized hailstorms presented a constant threat to crops. Another leading
economist of the time, Boris D. Brutskus, observed that peasants commonly viewed strip
scattering as a more reliable insurance strategy against the potential damages of hailstorm
than consolidated plots. A survey conducted by the Imperial Free Economic Society a
few years after the inception of the Stolypin land reform recorded instances of peasants
justifying their unwillingness to consolidate their strips by the fear that they could lose all
their crops in a single hailstorm. Numerous cases demonstrated that peasants had all
practical reasons to defend the communal practice of land scattering. According to widely
publicized reports, consolidated farms did suffer from crop failures as a result of
hailstorm damage, and the owners never received compensation from the local land
settlement organizations.104
The continental climate of European Russia, in fact, made crop production extremely
vulnerable to the localized effects of storm damage, particularly at the end of the growing
season, when the standing crop was brittle. In many areas, the rain tended to fall in bands,
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which might expose half of a commune's fields to frequent rains while leaving the other
half to suffer from drought. Other everyday risks included locust swarms, gopher
infestations, trampling by livestock, and fires sweeping through a field. Scattered strips
could reduce the potentially devastating consequences of these conditions.105
Contemporary peasant studies have provided compelling evidence of the economic
utility of strip cultivation in different parts of the world. The economic historian David N.
McCloskey, for example, argued that the scattering of land in English open fields served
as an effective insurance policy against risk “in a milieu in which agricultural yields were
low and unpredictable, and in which the costs of a shortfall—at best crushing debt or
malnutrition and its associated diseases, at worst starvation—were high.” Strip farming,
widespread throughout pre-industrial Europe, persisted well into the twentieth century in
many regions of the world. Wherever peasants employed the practice, they justified its
economic utility by its risk-spreading benefits. The rationale behind it was essentially
similar to that of modern investors, who hold diversified portfolios of shares in different
companies and in different markets.106
Importantly, strip cultivation could also allow peasant households to distribute their
labor resources effectively throughout the year. Because growing conditions might vary
considerably from spot to spot, land plots would be ready for tillage and harvesting at
different times. This made it possible to space out the execution of the major agricultural
operations like tilling the land, sowing crops, and collecting the harvest. Strips thus
enabled peasants to organize their labor at peak moments with less stress and more
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efficiency than on unified plots.107 Finally, strip cultivation promoted participation in
collective livestock grazing by preventing individual households from withdrawing its
land from the common grazing cycle. The economic historian Carl Dahlman used the
same argument to explain the persistence of the open-field system in Europe.108
Communal enforcement of simultaneous and uniform agricultural operations has also
been largely exaggerated. To be sure, communes often imposed common work regimes.
In regions with extremely severe land fragmentation, communes might forbid its
members to till, sow, or reap ahead of schedule. In those areas where strips and pathways
leading to them were particularly thin, coordinated execution of agricultural operations
helped peasants to prevent neighbors from walking over their land and damaging crops.
However, household members never had to collect crops on their strips exactly at the
same time. Crops could stand drying in the fields for some time after reaping, and one
week’s difference in the timing of reaping never caused any problems. Harvesting in the
spring field required particularly little coordination because the livestock would already
begin grazing on the winter field stubble before the ripening of spring crops. Grazing on
the spring field crop stubble would not normally start until September, when all but the
last crops—beets, potatoes, and sunflowers—would have been harvested.109
Significant regional variations in communal practices also proved their economic
rationality. Repartitions, for example, varied greatly depending on local contexts and
conditions. The most radical type of repartition, a general, or “black,” repartition
(obshchii, korennoi, or chernyi peredel), involved a complete restructuring of all the
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arable land in the village, a removal of all field boundaries, and a full revision of the
number, size, and location of land strips. All households returned their strips to the
commune, which then redistributed them between its members. Less radical forms of
repartition, a repartition “by lot” (zhereb'evka) and a “re-ordering” repartition
(pereverstka), also implied redistribution of strips between all household members, but
did not alter the size, number, and location of the existing strips. More frequently,
communes conducted various types of partial repartitions (chastnye peredely, svalkinavalki, skidki-nakidki), which involved only a few households, whose land holdings
were adjusted to changes in the size and structure of a household due to marriages or
family divisions. Some communes, in fact, never held general repartitions but maintained
a balance between the sizes of the households and their land allotments exclusively by
partial repartitions.110
The frequency of repartitions also varied across regions and time periods. Whereas
some communes maintained regular intervals between repartitions, others redistributed
their lands irregularly, only when needed. Many villages had abandoned repartitioning by
the late nineteenth century, others continued the practice with increasing frequency. In
the black-earth zone, general repartitions tended to be more frequent than in the nonblack-earth provinces and might take place as often as every three years. In most parts of
European Russia, communes undertook general repartitions every ten to fifteen years,
usually after poll tax censuses, which determined the current number of taxable “souls” in
a village. It made perfect sense to reapportion taxes and land allotments at the same time,
after a commune's tax liability had been adjusted according to population changes.
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Communes could also hold general repartitions after large numbers of villagers had died
in famines or epidemics, had been conscripted in wartime, or had migrated elsewhere.111
The criteria by which communes assigned land to households also varied from locale
to locale. Before the abolition of serfdom in 1861, communes typically allocated land to
each household according to its labor capacity measured by the number of marital pairs in
it (po tiaglam). The serf-owning nobility enforced this system of land distribution in
order to ensure each family’s capacity to fulfill its obligations to the landlord and the
state and to have enough resources left to subsist.112 After the emancipation, other
methods gradually replaced repartitions po tiaglam. By the end of the nineteenth century,
many communes were redistributing land according to the number of male souls per
household (po nalichnym dusham muzhskogo pola). Because males constituted the main
and most productive agricultural labor force, assigning more land to families containing
more males made perfect economic sense, because all adult male peasants in the village
remained employed and each household received an adequate amount of land
commensurate with its male labor force. Not surprisingly, many communes chose to
reduce their land repartition criteria to the actual number of males of working age in a
family (repartition po nalichnym rabotnikam muzhskogo pola), thus excluding non-adult
males from consideration. This measure did help communes to distribute land in more
precise proportions to each household's male labor force, but often led to more frequent
repartitions.113
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In the late nineteenth century, the migration of male peasants to the cities in search of
an additional income led to an increased involvement of women in agricultural activities.
Communes responded to this tendency by practicing repartitions based on the number of
all workers, or “producers” in a family, including women. Some communes even
assigned land on the basis of the total number of “consumers”, or mouths to feed, in each
household (po edokam). This repartition method clearly reflected communes’ growing
concern for more equal and fair distribution of land in the face of increasing economic
differentiation. Larger communes, however, feared that such repartitions might contribute
to extreme land fragmentation and preferred to distribute land according to males per
household.114
Communes in which peasants engaged in non-agricultural activities as well as farming
might use peasants’ earnings from crafts and trade as a criterion for land repartition. In
the central non-black-earth zone, land distribution criteria could include the number of
draught animals owned by the household. In regions with developed animal husbandry,
such as Siberia, communes allotted meadow land according to the number of cattle that
each household possessed.115
Various repartition rules and procedures represented different pragmatic responses of
communal peasants to specific local environmental, economic, and social conditions.
Even within one province, repartitioning practices could vary substantially from village
to village. Contrary to the common assertion that repartitions manifested above all the
pervasiveness of primitive egalitarianism in peasant culture, peasants themselves used the
repartition system to manage land and human resources. To be sure, repartitions played
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an important welfare function by providing them with the minimum amount of land they
needed to meet their tax obligations and to satisfy their subsistence needs.116
Undoubtedly, repartitions did reflect a certain degree of egalitarianism in communal
practices. Land redistributions ensured the right of each household to use at least some of
the commune's best and most accessible land. Peasant egalitarianism should not be
exaggerated, however. Even repartitions that took into account women workers, in fact,
treated them unequally. Male peasants were typically entitled to receive three times as
much land as females. Not uncommonly, communes declined apportioning land to
widows. Again, as many recent studies have stressed, repartitions served a far broader
range of economic and social objectives than just an egalitarian distribution of land. They
allowed communes to respond to changes brought about by out-migrations, family
divisions, or epidemics, to adjust the shape of the open fields to changes in crop rotations,
and to bring order into strip fields by reducing their number.117
Many of Kovalevskii’s contemporaries, including both the critics of the commune and
its Slavophile and populist defenders, regarded repartitioning as a uniquely Russian
phenomenon. Modern scholars, however, found examples of distributional land
communes throughout Europe, although most communes outside Eastern Europe
repartitioned only meadows, pastures, and waste lands. Customs similar to Russian
repartitions also existed in some non-European societies—for example, in pre-colonial
India and among Mongol nomads, who reassigned grazing rights in particular pastures in
accordance with changes in household size.118
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As paradoxical as it may seem, innovation has always formed an integral part of the
communal tradition. In fact, the economic strategies and farming techniques of
communal peasants never remained static. As we have seen, however, most of
Kovalevskii’s contemporaries never recognized the dynamic nature of communal
practices. Nineteenth-century scholars focused predominantly on the advantages brought
about by the large-scale transformation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European
agriculture—the Agricultural Revolution—and associated it with land enclosures and
privatization. Most of them ignored an earlier agricultural revolution that occurred in
Western and Northern Europe between the sixth and the ninth centuries, the period long
known as the “Dark Ages,” characterized by alleged economic and political stagnation.
August Meitzen and a few other nineteenth-century historians pioneered the study of
early medieval technological progress, particularly the introduction of the heavy wheeled
plow, as fostering the spread of open-field arrangements and other communal practices in
medieval German villages.119 Even the prominent twentieth-century historian Henri
Pirenne, who so brilliantly overturned the stereotypical portrayal of the early medieval
period as the “Dark Ages,” did not mention the significant innovations that occurred in
the rural economy during that time. It took an effort of the two other prominent
historians, Marc Bloch and Lynn White, to draw scholarly attention to technological
improvements in the predominantly communal medieval agriculture.120
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Today it has become common knowledge that the introduction of the heavy wheeled
plow during the period from the sixth to the ninth century represented a tremendous
landmark in the evolution of communal farming technology.121 One of the most
important implications for communal agriculture was that the use of the heavy-wheeled
plow required a cooperative effort. The deep plowing of heavy soils made its necessary to
team up a greater number of draught animals, up to eight oxen or four horses. This
significantly reinforced the economic value of communal farming practices for many
centuries to come, since only village communes could afford owning and using expensive
tools and feeding draught animals they required.122
The adoption of the three-field system represented another example of the communal
effort to improve farming methods. In comparison with the previously dominant twofield system, it increased the amount of land under cultivation from one-half to twothirds. The agricultural cycle also changed. In the two-field system, one field was planted
in the fall and the other left fallow, the process being reversed every year. In the threefield system, one field was planted in the fall with grain, another one was planted in the
spring with spring grain and peas, beans, and vetches, and the third lay fallow. In the
summer, when both winter and spring plantings were harvested, the cycle altered: the
fallow field became the winter field, the winter field became the spring field, and the
spring field turned to fallow. As a result, the varieties of vegetable protein from the
spring planting improved and varied the diet. Even more importantly, the three-field
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system retarded soil exhaustion and thus increased productivity. The beans yielded by the
same spring planting returned valuable nitrogen to the soil and the rotation of crops made
the exhaustion of the soil by exclusive grain growing less likely.123
Historians of English agriculture have stressed that innovation and risk-taking have
always been part of communal peasant practices. According to George E. Mingay, “the
old picture of an extremely conservative, rigid, and inefficient system which persisted
unchanged over the centuries has had to be considerably modified.”124 Despite limited
resources and insufficient agronomic knowledge, English communal peasants who
survived enclosure introduced many innovations. “Fields were divided so as to allow
more complex rotations and to reduce fallowing, and holdings were consolidated by
exchanges among the owners. New crops were brought in and grass leys appeared within
the common fields.”125 Even Arthur Young, a convinced eighteenth-century advocate of
enclosures, admitted that some areas under communal cultivation flourished and that
some open-field farmers were “sensible, intelligent men, for they agreed among
themselves to sow turnips instead of fallowing on many of their lands.”126 Historians
increasingly recognize that “the assumption that open fields were old-fashioned and
enclosed ones new and improved is unhistorical [and] has little bearing on the
agricultural revolution.”127
Along similar lines, historians of Russia have documented the peasant commune’s
capacity to promote and incorporate innovations. Far from being inflexible, the threefield system allowed for significant adaptations and modifications. The fallow field could
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be used for the cultivation of forage crops or could even be cut back to less than one-third
of the arable area. Peasants employed various strategies to modify the three-field
practices to include grass cultivation. For example, on the so-called employed fallow
(zaniatyi par) peasants sowed fast-maturing grasses like vetch as early as possible in the
spring and harvested it for hay in June. This technique made it possible for peasants to
accumulate at least four times more fodder than if the land had remained green fallow
and still left enough time for planting and sowing grains like rye for the next year.128
Tillage regimes could also be intensified within the three-field system. The second
tillage (dvoenie) of the fallow field represented one of the most widespread examples of
such improvement. Usually performed about a month after the raising of fallow, second
tilling improved the structure and moisture of the soil and suppressed the growth of
weeds, thus creating better conditions for subsequently sown crops. In Voronezh district,
for example, this practice allowed to raise rye yields from 78 to 82.1 puds (from 1.4 to
1.5 tons) of grain per desiatina and to collect nine extra puds of straw in one year. In drier
years, increases in grain yields due to this technique could be even larger. The rapid
spread of second tilling demonstrated communal peasants' willingness to adopt improved
farming techniques even at the cost of increased labor intensity. Despite the fact that the
second tillage often overlapped with the reaping of rye, thus demanding an additional
labor investment during one of the busiest periods in the agricultural calendar, many
communes readily included it into their tillage regimes. Communal peasants were
agreeing to work harder in order to produce more, even though dvoenie could provide
only a relatively modest return in the form of crop yields.129
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Another improved tilling technique—the plowing of the spring field during the
preceding fall (ziablevaia vspashka, or simply ziab)--began spreading rapidly among
communal peasants in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Aware of the harmful
effects of premature spring tillage on soil quality, peasants often chose not to till the
spring field at all, especially because grains like oat could be sown directly onto the
remnants of the rye stubble and then immediately tilled in and harrowed. The
introduction of ziab reduced the potential dangers of early spring tillage and at the same
time provided all the benefits of pre-sowing tillage. In various regions, the execution of
the ziab system increased average grain yields by 7 to 20 per cent. In addition to
productivity increase, ziab allowed to improve the peasants' overall labor regime and
resource allocation. Instead of working horses in the early spring, when they were more
likely to be weakened by malnutrition or illnesses over the long winter, peasants could
complete plowing in September or October without overstressing themselves and their
horses. Consequently, this permitted peasants to begin sowing earlier in the spring, which
significantly relieved the spring labor crisis.130
In addition to improving the traditional farming techniques, peasants experimented
with new multi-field systems that included grass cultivation. They quickly recognized
that grasses like clover not only provided large yields of excellent fodder for livestock but
also acted as fertilizers for subsequent crops. In many cases, zemstvo agronomists
encouraged and assisted peasants in these experiments by helping them to set up
demonstration plots and explaining the benefits of crops like clover. Grasses regenerated
the soil by accumulating reserves of nitrogen from the air and storing them in their roots.
The northern and central non-black-earth regions of Russia, where nitrogen-deficient
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arable lands predominated, particularly needed such improvements. In the black-earth
provinces, where lands generally did not suffer from nitrogen shortage, grasses could still
enrich the quality of frequently over-tilled land by choking out weeds and pulling up
phosphate and potassium from deeper layers of the soil, which grain roots could not
normally reach.131
As a rule, a village-wide introduction of grass cultivation occurred after several years
of trial on the garden plots of individual members, on rented or purchased land, or on
specially allotted “experimental” lands (vygorodki) separated from the regular three-field
system. Once a village majority recognized the advantages of grass cultivation, a
communal assembly passed a resolution to incorporate the new technique into the regular
crop rotation cycle.132 Such gradualism, however, did not necessarily reflect the peasants'
conservatism or apathy, as it has been commonly argued. As we have seen, practical
considerations most often determined the pace of change. Because grass cultivation
required significant adjustments and modifications in the traditional three-field system, a
commune could adopt it only after trying it on lands outside the regular rotation, thus
ensuring that its introduction would not threaten the peasants' subsistence.
With the aid of zemstvo agronomists, peasants in various regions came up with
different alternatives to the existing three-field arrangements: four-, or six-, or even eightfield rotation systems. Four-field farming spread particularly rapidly in non-black-earth
provinces. In the Iamburg district of Petersburg province, for example, 14 per cent of
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communes had introduced four-field cultivation by the late 1890s.133 In the Volokolamsk
district of Moscow province, where only two villages were sowing forage crops and
employing a four-field rotation in 1892, 127 villages were using the system by 1900, and
two years later, 245 out of 368 villages in the district practiced it.134 Not surprisingly,
zemstvo agronomists enthusiastically praised the role of Russian communes as
“pioneers” in the progressive transition to grass cultivation.135
Communal peasants devised simple but effective strategies to reduce or eliminate the
negative effects of strip farming. Boundary furrows, verges, and headlands, commonly
believed to reduce the amount of arable land, could be utilized for multiple purposes.
Furrows and ditches marking strip borders could serve as drainage channels. In extremely
dry years, peasants could collect at least some crop from the furrows, and in wet years
crops could be yielded on the well-drained ridges. Verges and headlands provided space
for depositing stones cleared from the land. Occasionally, peasants used these areas for
mowing or grazing of tethered livestock. Distant strips could be converted to pasture or
hay for collective use by the entire village or rented out to neighboring villages. In
Moscow province, peasants assigned abandoned distant parcels, called pustyri, to
households that had managed the land badly in the past or were in the process of giving
up farming. In the context of the commune's joint obligation to meet the annual tax levy,
this measure represented a rational means of conserving the collective land resource and
ensuring its most effective use for the benefit of the community.136
133

Kerans, Mind and Labor, 223-303; Zyrianov, Krest'ianskaia obshchina, 60-61, 220-222; Vorontsov,
Progressivnye techeniia, 156.
134
B.G. Bazhaev, Travopol’noe khoziaistvo v nechernozemnoi polose Evropeiskoi Rossii (St. Petersburg,
1903), 260, 331, quoted in Kingston-Mann, “Peasant Communes”, 38.
135
S.V. Kuznetsov, Traditsii russkogo zemledeliia: praktika i religiozno-nravstvennye vozzreniia (Moscow:
In-t etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1995), 47-48; Kingston-Mann, “Peasant Commune,” 38.
136
Pallot, “Development”, 91; Land Reform, 77-81.

78

As recent peasant studies have demonstrated, critics of the commune tended to
overstate the time wasted by peasants in journeys from strip to strip. Even when an
individual household held its land in multiple strips, it rarely needed to work more than a
few strips in a single day. Moreover, separate strips could be adjusted to the size of a
single day's plowing. In England and right-bank Ukraine, strips traditionally held the
amount of land that could be tilled in one day: a “day of land” (den' zemli). Russian
peasants practiced similar adjustments of the size of strips to the performance of
agricultural tasks. In Iaroslavl province, peasants arranged the width of strips to allow
“four revolutions of the scythe,” and in Kaluga province they measured strips in units of
three paces, which matched the distance that seeds could be broadcast.137
Peasants tried various strategies to combat excessive thinning of strips. Households
with narrow strips practiced exchanging strips with the neighbors to make their holdings
wider. Small families could merge and reapportion strips among themselves. Some
communes preferred to rent a part of their land to neighboring villages instead of dividing
it into very thin strips. Larger communes could fight the negative effects of land
scattering by forming new, smaller villages, or sub-communes affiliated with a parent
commune.138
In fact, peasants tried to avoid throwing seeds onto neighbors’ strips. Appreciating the
value of grains, they sowed carefully enough to keep all the seeds on their own land.
Concerns about unlike sowings on adjacent fields did not deter peasants from
experimenting with new crops. For instance, the survey of communal peasants and
individual farmers in the six provinces of the central agricultural region in 1910-1911
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revealed approximately the same percentage of respondents from the both groups who
had adopted improved seeds. Communes rarely imposed any restrictions on crops choices
beyond the general division into winter and spring crops, and even these limitations could
be modified. With the exception of the fallow field, peasants could select their sowings as
they saw fit. The quality of each unit of soil determined crop choices in most cases. Crops
that tended to grow poorly on a particular field would not be sown there. In some
instances, peasants even managed to overcome the commune's prohibition to sow on the
fallow field.139
Land redistributions, commonly blamed for intensifying land fragmentation, could in
fact be used to reduce it. In Vladimir and Tver provinces, for example, peasants
undertook general repartitions to eliminate the excessive multiplication of strips that
resulted from frequent partial redistributions. Instead of multiple strips in the fields, each
household received one parcel per field. Communes modified their repartitioning
techniques in order to redistribute land in wider strips. For example, they could reduce
the precision of their qualitative evaluation of land and thus decrease the number of
furlongs subject to repartitioning. This measure alone was reported to reduce
fragmentation by four to six times. Some communes enforced regulations regarding the
width of strips, not allowing its members to subdivide their holdings below a certain size.
In Smolensk province, for example, each parcel had to contain at least a quarter of a
desiatina. In Iaroslavl, Moscow, Orenburg, and Tver provinces, peasants adopted a new
system of allocating land to households in standard units called hundreds (sotni). In
Moscow province, communes practiced a variety of other techniques, including
139
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apportioning land to small households collectively and allowing them to decide among
themselves how to divide it, or allotting double-sized strips to small households in
alternate fields.140
Families that received lower-grade or distant parcels as a result of the new methods of
strip widening could be compensated in money or with supplementary land. In Moscow
province, for example, households whose strips were vulnerable to trespass and
compaction due to their proximity to roadways and meadows received additional strips.
The Kekhotskaia commune in Archangel province divided all arable land into three
categories according to its distance from the village. Households which did not have land
in the first category were entitled to receive twice as much land in the second category
and three times as much in the third.141
The massive evidence gathered by zemstvo surveys indicates that communes could
utilize the repartition mechanism to sustain high farming standards and even to foster
agricultural advancements. Communes could manipulate their repartition techniques to
reward their member households for manuring and other land improving measures.
Again, the motive underlying these practices was predominantly economic, not
egalitarian, in nature. Repartitioning land in order to ensure the effective use and
improvement of communal land facilitated the reproduction of the village land resource
base and the payment of taxes.142
In the non-black-earth provinces, communes often practiced the so-called “shuffling
repartition” (peredel v peredvizhku), which involved the widening or narrowing of strips
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in accordance with changes in household structure. The majority of strips typically
retained their central core, migrating slightly backwards and forwards across a field.
Shuffling repartitions thus allowed households to extend their use of the same strips for
up to thirty years. The shuffling repartitions represented another example of communal
peasants’ attempts to maximize the effective use of land by retaining existing strips in the
hands of their current users and simply adjusting the size of holdings to changes in
households without relocating them. This technique allowed communal peasants not only
to extend their use of the same strips, but also to widen strips when needed.143
Agricultural innovation and productivity growth depended on consistent efforts to
improve soil quality by the use of fertilizers. By the turn of the twentieth century,
fertilizer use became widespread in communes all over Russia, except the southern blackearth provinces, where manuring did little to improve the already fertile soil. Zemstvo
statistics indicated that communes in the central non-black-earth region used organic
fertilizers even more intensively than private land owners.144
Communes devised various reward mechanisms to stimulate peasants to manure their
land. Peasants who fertilized their allotments received either special monetary payments
at the time of repartition, or similarly well-fertilized plots, or the right to retain their
original allotments. Manured strips (navozniki) could be excluded from repartitions and
kept in the permanent possession of their current users. Once peasants stopped using
manure, however, these strips again became subject to general repartition rules, to be
redistributed to other owners. If a household consistently failed to maintain or improve
soil quality on its lands, a village assembly could penalize it by assigning it the same or
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even more degraded strips at the next repartition. Thus, contrary to the conventional
belief that repartitions discouraged peasants from innovations and fertilizer use because
peasants were likely to lose their allotments in the next repartition, communes in fact
used the repartition mechanism to stimulate soil quality improvement.145
Some communes went even further by making manuring mandatory for all member
households. In Moscow province, for example, village assemblies passed resolutions
specifying how much manure each household was required to place on its allotment each
year. In some cases, communes prohibited the sale of manure to neighboring villages as
well as its use on non-commune lands until the commune's requirements had been met.146
Such uniform measures, however, were possible only in the regions with more or less
equal quality of land. Often, great variations in soil quality within a single commune
required more flexible approaches. In such cases, peasants adjusted the use of manure
according to a variety of factors, including the type of soil, the location of the land
allotment, the amount of livestock, and the specific needs of the household and the
community. Fertilizer use might also vary according to cultivation regimes necessary for
different crops. In the black-earth provinces, for example, manure was rarely used in
cereal cultivation, but frequently applied to strips reserved for crops like tobacco,
vegetables, and hemp, which required intensive cultivation.147 The communal practice of
mutual aid (pomochi) also promoted the village-wide use of fertilizers. Long before the
Emancipation, communal peasants assisted each other in delivering manure to the fields.
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Joint effort in this case helped to complete manuring in a more effective and timely
manner.148
Zemstvo statistics provided similarly impressive record of communes' other land
improvement activities, such as swamp drainage, irrigation, and land clearing. Again,
because such projects usually required large labor input, communes often possessed
better resources than individual farmers to implement them fast and effectively. V.I.
Orlov documented numerous examples in Moscow province of communal peasants
acting in common in swamp-drainage projects and transforming massive amounts of
infertile soil into productive land. In addition to collective digging of drainage ditches,
communes used special machinery, with rental payments raised by means of levies that
the communes imposed on their members. Although typically zemstvo experts assisted
peasants in these projects, peasants often acted independently, devising and implementing
improvement plans without any outside guidance.149
In Tambov and Saratov provinces, communes organized irrigation projects including
the digging of ditches, wells, and ponds and the use of primitive but effective peasantdesigned and built water-raising machines. In Ekaterinoslav province, communes in one
district built a water-supply system which extended over a distance of three versts. In the
thickly forested Vologda province, collective land clearing projects included tree cutting,
digging up of roots, and the burning of stubble. Although zemstvo statisticians never
claimed that all communes engaged in such activities, they used land improvement
measures as evidence of the commune's capacity to act as an agent of economic progress.
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Zemstvo statistics also reported the peasants' growing interest in technological change.
Although the wooden plow (sokha), the wooden-framed harrow, the scythe, and the flail
still predominated the late nineteenth-century Russian countryside, the use of plows, seed
drills, and reaping machines was becoming standard practice. Characteristically, the
equipment-lending stations established by local zemstvos during the Stolypin reform
were often unable to meet increasing peasant demand for improved tools and
machinery.150
Despite the challenges that the introduction of new tools presented, communal
peasants quickly recognized their advantages. The plow, for example, improved soil
fertility by tilling the soil deeper and eliminating weeds more effectively than the sokha.
Unlike the sokha, which could easily skid off the tillage line in stubble and tough soils,
the plow went straight along the tillage line and maintained an even depth of plowing.
This constituted a significant advantage because keeping tillage lines straight helped to
maintain a proper distance between furrows. Straight tillage also eliminated the
probability of leaving the significant portion of unutilized land in between the furrows,
which would be the case if the gaps were too wide. The plow offered a significantly
wider range of adjustment than the sokha in both the depth and width of plowing. Its
stability enabled it to perform operations like cross-tillage (perpendicular to previous
furrows), which was important for leveling off the surface. The plow's land-improving
effects allowed peasants to sow less seeds per unit of land and thus to economize on seed
grains. Finally, whereas the sokha could easily swell up in wet weather and become
brittle in dry weather, the plow was much more resistant to weather conditions and less
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likely to break. The iron parts of the sokha tended to dull faster than the steel share of
good plows.151
The next stage of the farming process, sowing, was improved by the increasing use of
the seed drill instead of hand-sowing. This tool maximized the seeds' growth potential by
sowing them at a predetermined depth and at an appropriate distance from each other,
which allowed crops to grow faster and more uniformly, so all of them would ripe by the
time of reaping. The seed drill also made it possible to employ the so-called “ribbon
sowing” (lentochnyi posev), an advanced technique that permitted peasants to arrange the
sprouts in even rows set widely apart, after which they could perform additional tillage
between the rows in order to kill weeds and retain soil moisture.152
Mechanized threshing increasingly replaced traditional technologies like flail
threshing, rail beating, and animal trampling. Threshing machines powered by hand,
horse, and engines increased productivity at a dramatic rate. Despite the fact that they
could smash from a minimum of two to four per cent of the grains to a maximum of
twenty to twenty-six percent when improperly adjusted or operated, they could thresh up
to twenty or even twenty-five haystacks (kopen) of grain per day, which equaled to
around half of the quantity of an average family's annual harvest. The major problem
with threshing machines was that even its simplest hand-powered versions were
expensive, while horse-driven models might require from four to six horses to operate.
Wealthier peasants, who were most likely to acquire these machines, usually hired them
out, together with a couple of horses, to other families for an affordable fee. According to
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zemstvo data, more than half of the peasants were using machine threshers by the early
1900s.153
About the same time, peasants started utilizing winnowing and sorting machines
instead of the traditional spades, sieves, and shovels. The most advanced models of the
winnowing machine could winnow as much as 100-150 puds from the threshing floor in
just one hour. Since most peasants rarely or never needed such a work rate, they
commonly preferred slower, cheaper, and less advanced versions. Very popular among
European Russian peasants were hand-powered models manufactured in Riazan and
Smolensk provinces.154
The sorting machine, due to its ability to combine winnowing, cleaning, and sorting
operations, represented an even more efficient tool. Its high speed, low labor input
requirement, and the capacity to separate chaff, weed seeds, and different-size grains
made it one of the most advanced technological innovations available at the time. Again,
due to its extremely high cost, only communes and agricultural cooperatives could afford
it. Local agronomists enthusiastically propagandized the benefits of the various models of
sorters and strongly encouraged peasants to purchase them for collective use.155
In general, peasants selected new agricultural implements very carefully. Local
geographical and economic conditions, soil quality, and other specific circumstances of a
given area determined peasants' decisions to adopt or reject the use of improved tools and
machines. Often, peasants combined new tools with traditional ones. The fact that
communal peasants could be reluctant to adopt a particular tool did not necessarily reflect
their indifference or hostility to innovation. As a rule, they were unwilling to use
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advanced tools when they were convinced of their counter-productivity. The plow, for
example, presented significant disadvantages for owners of multiple thin strips. First,
being heavier than the sokha, the plow was more difficult to maneuver around obstacles
and to carry from strip to strip. Second, the wheeled plow might need up to five yards to
make a comfortable turn at the end of a furrow, whereas the ability of the sokha to turn
tightly was important when tilling very thin strips. Third, the sokha's adjustable politsa
enabled the tiller to direct all lifted soil toward one side of the strip. Because the plow did
not allow this, it required double the number of dead furrows per strip. A plowman had to
walk all the way to the other side of the strip each time he completed a furrow.156
Poorer peasants also had many reasons to prefer the sokha over the plow. The low
price of the sokha made it affordable. It could operate with a single horse, whereas the
use of the plow often required two horses. In addition, the sokha could perform a variety
of additional functions such as covering seeds, planting potatoes, or tilling in between
ribbon-sown crops. Finally, because of its simpler construction, local blacksmiths could
always repair a sokha and village experts could help peasants to assemble it, which was
not always the case with plows. Only the establishment of agronomic networks
throughout European Russia in 1910 eased the problems associated with the acquisition
and maintenance of plows and other new tools.157
Most importantly, the plow performed poorly on certain types of soils or in certain
weather conditions. In Vladimir province, for example, peasants preferred to use the
sokha on sandy soils because the plow tended to till the land too deeply and bring up a
layer of unfertile sand, which significantly decreased productivity. For similar reasons,
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agronomists recommended the use of the sokha instead of the plow for the second tillage
in the black-earth region. Plowing during dry summer months could result in raising large
brick-like clods that no harrow could reduce.158
In some cases, deeper tillage provided by the plow could actually damage soil quality.
Plowing more than one and a half vershki (2.5 inches) deeper than the soil had previously
been tilled might lift hard and unfertile soil that had not been in contact with air for a long
time. Even harrows with metal teeth often could not handle thick layers of such soil.
Generally, tilling deeper than about thirteen centimeters was rarely needed. Rye, oats, and
potatoes did in fact require slightly deeper tillage than other crops. For the most part,
however, as experimental stations in Samara and Simbirsk demonstrated, deeper tillage
increased crop yields by only a few percent. Contrary to the widespread belief that deeper
tillage increased productivity by facilitating the penetration of roots into the soil, Russian
agronomic knowledge determined that crop roots would seek nourishment and grow
below the tilled layer of land anyway, regardless of tillage depth. As a matter of fact, the
timing of tillage represented a much more important factor than the depth, especially in
drier climates.159
On lands infected with couch grass, the plow could even worsen the situation. The
plow's shares cut under the entire surface of the soil and turned it over, leaving most of
the root fragments intact. As a result, the grass would resprout from the undamaged root
fragments and spread to an even larger territory than before plowing. The sokha's blades,
by contrast, undercut at least two-thirds of the surface and brought most of the root
fragments up to the surface, where they could dry out. It would not then come as a
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surprise that even in regions where peasants widely used the plow, they still continued to
combine it with the sokha. In Moscow province in the 1880s, for example, peasants tilled
the land with a plow and after harrowing tilled it again with a sokha.160
Land cultivation was not the only area of economic improvement. Communal peasants
actively responded to the expanding market opportunities opened up by Russia's intensive
industrialization and urbanization in the second half of the nineteenth century. Growing
urban demand for agricultural products provided the rural population with regional
markets and incentives to engage in commercial farming and gardening, or the
production of meat and dairy. Villagers delivered milk, butter, eggs, poultry, and
vegetables to neighboring cities and towns or sold their products to buyers traveling
around the countryside. Families used their private garden plots (usad'ba) or part of their
arable land holdings for cultivating onions, potatoes, cabbages, raspberries, sunflowers,
tobacco, flax, hemp, and other cash crops that might yield a profitable price at the
markets. Some communities or entire rural regions specialized in particular cash crops
and practiced inter-village trade. Many realized the commercial advantages of fishing,
horse-breeding, raising geese and chicken, and rearing cattle and sheep. During the nonagricultural season or when local conditions did not allow for enough income from
farming operations, peasants focused on non-agrarian activities. Local industries and
trades (promysly) have always played a significant role in augmenting rural household
incomes. Growing markets prompted individual peasants and families to expand their
pursuits in handicrafts and small-scale manufacturing. They realized that spinning,
weaving, hand-knitting, and cloth-making could serve much more than merely domestic
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needs. By the turn of the twentieth century, a growing number of villages had been
turning into semi-farming, semi-industrial communities.161
In addition to diversifying economic activities within the commune, peasants
increasingly sought supplementary income outside the village. Critics commonly blamed
the commune for placing severe restrictions on peasant mobility, which allegedly
impeded rural development by causing over-population and aggravating the land hunger
problem. The village assembly might in fact take some of the household's land at the next
repartition if an adult family member had been absent from the village for an extended
period of time. Evidence suggests, however, that peasants were able to leave the village
in search of alternate employment when they were willing to do so. Because the time
between redistributions tended to be relatively long and, most importantly, because
outside earnings could add substantially to the family's income, peasants actively
engaged in seasonal or long-term migrant labor (otkhodnichestvo). They might find a job
in a factory or a small business in a nearby city or work as hired laborers in bigger farms.
Frequently, migrant peasants formed cooperatives (arteli) specializing in a certain area of
production. The data on internal passports issued during the post-Emancipation period
demonstrate the dramatic increase in peasant mobility. The notions of the commune's
restrictive nature and of peasants' isolationism and attachment to the commune appear to
be largely overstated. As a matter of fact, it was not the commune but the pace of
urbanization and industrialization that limited peasant mobility. Despite their intensive
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growth, Russian industries could not absorb migrant labor in greater numbers than they
did.162
In light of the above discussed evidence of the commune's capacity to innovate and to
respond to market opportunities, what conclusions can we make about its economic
performance? There is no doubt, of course, that communal farming at the turn of the
twentieth century continued to rely predominantly on the traditional practice of extensive
rather than intensive production. In most cases, the need for subsistence rather than a
desire to maximize productivity determined the peasants' economic decisions. Peasants
preferred to use crops and farming techniques that had been tried and trusted by
generations and could thus ensure the production of food sufficient for subsistence. They
tended to avoid risky experimentation, which might improve production but might also
ruin the entire harvest and therefore jeopardize the household's survival.
Do these features of the communal economy testify to its stagnant and backward
nature, as its critics argued? Evidence gathered by Russian zemstvo statisticians,
agronomists, and economists (and “rediscovered” by recent studies) suggests much more
complex patterns of communal peasants' economic behavior than it has been commonly
assumed. In line with the pragmatic risk-aversion logic, communal peasants certainly
exercised caution in adopting innovations, but they never were hostile or unreceptive to
beneficial change. In fact, as Kovalevskii's comparative-historical analysis demonstrated,
communal practices never remained static and uniform. Peasants modified and adapted
their economic behavior to local environments and changing socioeconomic conditions,
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which led to considerable regional variations in repartitioning and farming techniques.
They readily adopted new tools and techniques when they proved to be more effective or
better suited to specific local conditions than traditional practices.
The capacity of the village commune to introduce technological and farming
improvements became particularly evident during the post-Emancipation period.
Communal peasants responded to the changes that Russia's intensive modernization and
industrialization brought to the countryside. Peasants increasingly used new tools and
machines, engaged in commercial farming, trade, and other market-oriented activities.
They improved and diversified traditional farming techniques such as the three-field
system and experimented with grass cultivation and multi-field systems.
Critics of the commune underestimated the viability and flexibility of Russian
communal agriculture. The commune's restrictive rules and regulations, they argued,
made productivity improvements and individual initiative impossible. Strong evidence,
however, indicates that the actual operating arrangements of the village commune were
much more flexible than its formal rules might suggest.163 As we have seen, despite
imposing some constraints, the commune left substantial room for individual initiative.
The three-field system allowed for considerable flexibility in the selection of crops and
farming procedures. The commune provided entrepreneurial peasants with resources and
opportunities for experimentation that individual farmers could rarely afford. Commune
members could try new crops and farming methods on specially designated lands or
collectively rented plots. Once the majority in the commune became convinced of the
163

The flexibility of communal arrangements in the Russian post-Emancipation village is discussed in Paul
R. Gregory, Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation to the First Five-Year
Plan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 50-52. For evidence from medieval Western Europe,
see Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984), 153.

93

benefits of a new crop or technique, the assembly decided to adopt it on a village-wide
scale.
Contemporary observers, including Kovalevskii, stressed the dual character of the
Russian village commune. The commune's economy and property relations, in fact,
represented a combination of both collective and individualistic claims and practices.
Each family possessed its own dwelling and a garden plot, as well as livestock and tools,
with which it cultivated its portion of communal land. The commune did not command
the farming and economic operations of individual member households or appropriate the
product of their labor. Strip cultivation and common grazing usually did not prevent
peasants from managing their sowings as they saw fit.164
Contemporary observers pointed to the capacity of the village communes to adopt and
spread innovations faster and more effectively than individual farmers. Irrigation and
other improvements that required collective effort could be implemented more rapidly in
communal villages than on private farms. Unlike individual cultivators, communes
possessed sufficient labor and financial resources to buy new tools and machines and to
engage in large-scale projects. Communes often fostered manuring and other advanced
agricultural techniques by rewarding peasants for their efforts at improvement.
The growth of agricultural output in the 1880s-1890s corroborates the significant
economic potential of the post-Emancipation village commune. According to Gregory,
Russian net grain and potato output in the 1880s-1900s rose at an annual rate of over
three percent, that is, well ahead of rural population growth (1.2 percent per annum).165
Average grain yields per hectare increased by 1.5 percent and output per worker grew by
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approximately 1.35 percent each year, which by 1911 allowed Russian peasants to collect
yields close to those in the countries with similarly short and moisture-deficient growing
seasons like Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Argentina. By the early 1890s, Russia's percapita grain and potato output slightly exceeded the European average and was more than
double the levels for Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Japan.166 Russia's stock of agricultural
equipment roughly trebled between 1890 and 1913.167 In the 1890s, agriculture consumed
more of Russia's iron output than did the rapidly expanding railway industry.168
In view of this evidence, the widespread assumption that the village commune trapped
peasants in an “almost unbreakable cycle of poverty”169 appears to be an exaggeration.
The predominantly subsistence-oriented communal economy did not keep peasants on the
edge of starvation and destitution. In fact, conclusive evidence suggests that peasant
living standards steadily improved in the last two decades before the inception of the
Stolypin land reform. A key indicator of peasant real income, grain retained by peasants
for their own consumption, grew three times faster than did rural population. Grains like
wheat, which had been considered a “luxury” and produced primarily for the market prior
to the 1890s, were becoming part of the peasant diet. Peasants also enriched their diets by
growing diverse crops and vegetables, particularly potatoes, which significantly increased
their calorie intake. In the 1890s, per-capita food supplies in Russia were considerably
higher than those in Southern Europe and Japan. Agricultural capital stock (farm
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equipment, structures, and livestock) was also growing more rapidly than farm
population during this period.170
Undoubtedly, extreme poverty did exist in pre-revolutionary rural Russia, particularly
in the most densely populated central black-earth region. Recent studies, however, have
criticized the tendency of many Russian and Western historians to generalize about the
condition of the entire Russian agriculture based on the extreme cases of rural poverty in
some areas. Economic historians have convincingly demonstrated that the existence of
rural poverty in a particular time and place does not necessarily reflect its trend over time
and its spatial distribution. Evidence of the economic decline in one area may conceal
evidence of successful agricultural performance in other regions. Even though some
agricultural regions may experience a decline in per capita output, the aggregate national
per capita output can be on the rise.171 Some types of sources can produce misleading
evidence. For example, government surveys, which have commonly been used as a
graphic proof of agricultural decline in late nineteenth-century Russia, generally focused
on problematic cases rather than success stories. Literary accounts of that period also
often tended to depict the most downtrodden families rather than average ones.
Evidence of the compatibility of subsistence and rational economic orientations tends
to vindicate Kovalevskii's analysis of the Russian village commune. The subsistence
priorities of communal peasants did not prevent them from maximizing productivity and
profit. The village commune possessed a significant economic potential, which allowed it
to become an agent of change and improvement. The Russian government, however,
chose to ignore the capacity of the commune to contribute to economic progress.
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Chapter IV. Kovalevskii's Opposition to Stolypin's Land Reform

The inception of the Stolypin land reform in 1906 presented Kovalevskii with an
opportunity to voice his opinions about the Russian village commune. Kovalevskii’s
scholarly findings led him to oppose the Stolypin land reform. He criticized Stolypin's
attempts to undermine the village commune and to pressure peasants to separate from
communes. Although he believed firmly in private agriculture, he argued that in country
dominated by communal traditions the state must not destroy the collective economy by
legislative fiat. He accused the government of advancing its own political agenda instead
of promoting beneficial change in the countryside.172
Prior to the Revolution of 1905, the attitudes of Russian officials toward the postEmancipation peasant commune had been strikingly ambivalent. On the one hand,
bureaucrats viewed communal practices as economically “backward” and “irrational.” On
the other, the tsarist government strongly supported the village commune on political,
fiscal, and administrative grounds. In the absence of seigniorial authority in the village,
communes acted as local organs of social control. Communal regulations proved to be an
effective hindrance to the impoverishment of the peasant masses, which, in government's
eyes, made the commune a guarantor of social stability and a strong safeguard against
revolution. Repartition practices ensured that peasants redistributed land among
themselves instead of making land claims against the gentry. Finally, the principle of
collective financial responsibility ensured that peasants met their fiscal obligations and
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thus provided a stable flow of revenue for the state. Clearly, political and administrative
concerns predominated in the governmental policy toward the commune prior to the
Stolypin reform.
The same proved to be true after the revolution of 1905, when the active participation
of communal peasants in rural upheavals radically changed official attitudes. Once the
communes demonstrated that they could serve as agents of the peasants' organized
protest, the government immediately decided to replace them by private farms. A series
of legislative acts introduced in 1906-1911 suggested two major changes. First, every
peasant family received the right to consolidate their strips into one plot and withdraw
from the commune by forming a separate farm (otrub) or requesting an individual land
allotment outside the village (khutor). In contrast to previous laws requiring the consent
of at least a two-third majority in the village to allow a peasant to leave the commune, the
Stolypin decrees permitted peasants to separate from the commune without approval of
the other commune members. Second, peasants living in villages which had not
undertaken general repartitions during the previous twenty four years were automatically
declared owners of their individual land holdings. This measure represented the most
radical change in the rural economy, allowing the authorities to eliminate non-repartition
village communes regardless of whether or not their members were willing to abandon
communal practices.
By creating a large class of rural property owners, the government sought to
consolidate the political support for the regime among the country's largest social group.
According to reformers, private ownership rights would ensure farmers' loyalty and
obedience to the regime. Stolypin himself repeatedly emphasized the explicitly political

98

significance of the land reform. Presented the land reform as “the wager on the strong,”
he proclaimed that privatization would turn hard-working peasants into economically
prosperous and politically conservative citizens. Ignoring both the evidence of the
commune's economic capacity and the potential dangers of the radical change in the
peasant economy, state officials sought to eliminate the commune as soon as possible.173
Kovalevskii warned Russian policy-makers that Stolypin might well achieve his goal
of creating a class of politically conservative private property owners, but at the cost of
increasing the mass of impoverished and potentially revolutionary peasants. An
accelerated transition to private agriculture, he insisted, would intensify social
polarization in the village. Although a few wealthy villagers would benefit from
privatization and new market opportunities, millions of poor peasants would be unable to
compete with them. As a result, they would lose their lands, turn into rural proletarians,
and, in desperation, opt for violent protests that would threaten political stability.
Kovalevskii emphasized that the Russian political and economic system was
unprepared to deal with the social consequences of the Stolypin land reform. Despite
intensive industrialization in 1890s-1900s, capitalism in Russia had not reached the stage
when urban industries would be able to offer jobs to millions of rural proletarians. The
cities would fail to absorb a large-scale migration of the peasant masses desperately
searching for work and new places to live. The state, in turn, lacked financial resources to
implement a large-scale poor relief program to prevent a massive social chaos.
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Instead of fostering stability, Kovalevskii stressed, the Stolypin reform would only
aggravate the existing social problems. Referring to the studies by leading Russian
economists and zemstvo statisticians, he pointed to the fact that the post-Emancipation
village had already been suffering from the mounting social and economic differentiation.
In Kovalevskii's opinion, the government acted irresponsibly in seeking to weaken the
traditional communal guarantees of security. The destruction of the source of peasants'
livelihood would “quite legitimately” provoke violent protests and resistance to reform.
As a result, peasants would come to form part of an impoverished and frustrated majority,
which would be easily driven to revolution.
To support his prognosis, Kovalevskii cited numerous historical precedents
demonstrating the potential social dangers of radical agrarian change. His research on late
medieval and early modern England provided compelling evidence of the devastating
social consequences of enforced enclosure of the common fields which produced masses
of landless rural proletarians, who fled to already crowded cities in search of work and
food.174 Similarly disastrous were the results of the aggressive anti-communal policies of
the British colonial administration in nineteenth-century India. The break-up of the Indian
panchayat commune led to peasant impoverishment, the decline of competition, the
concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few, and social unrest. His other
examples included North Africa and Latin America, where the use of force by colonial
authorities eager to eliminate local communal practices caused social polarization and
long-term economic decay.175
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Kovalevskii urged the Russian government to refrain from acting like “colonizers” of
their own people. He ridiculed the rhetoric used by the British colonial administrators to
describe the disappearance of the Indian panchayat communes. Claims about the alleged
backwardness of communal practices, Kovalevskii asserted, allowed the British to avoid
responsibility for the poverty and suffering caused by their anti-communal policies.
Similarly, in North Africa, French colonists ridiculed the backwardness of local peasants
and justified the forcible introduction of private land tenure by the claim that they were
serving the cause of economic progress. In fact, as Kovalevskii demonstrated, they were
pursuing the political aim of destroying the basis of Algerian society. As he saw it,
idealized notions of the unconditional advantages of private-property rights simply
disguised French efforts to establish their control over the Algerian economy.
Kovalevskii was not alone in his attempts to apply the historical experience of other
nations to Russia's rural development. His colleague and friend, Paul Vinogradoff, used
his studies of medieval England to criticize Stolypin for creating the prospect of social
upheaval and “gambling with revolution.” Blaming Stolypin for radicalism, Vinogradoff
emphasized that Russia needed “thorough organic reforms, something like the movement
of the sixties on a larger scale.”176 The historian Ivan V. Luchitskii likewise drew on his
examination of the village commune in Spain to stress the importance of social
consequences of the rural reform in Russia.177
Kovalevskii would have undoubtedly agreed with another Russian student of medieval
English agriculture, Aleksandr N. Savin, who argued that destroying the village
commune in Russia was the same as “planting gunpowder in the cellar of a house where
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you yourself live.”178 Instead of attempting to eliminate communal guarantees of security,
Kovalevskii insisted, the state should protect them by legislative measures. He questioned
the possibility of creating a class of socially stable and politically conservative class of
strong individual farmers in the near future, which the authors of the land reform widely
propagandized. Instead, Kovalevskii urged the government to support communal
institutions with their security mechanisms and mutual aid practices that had proven to
impede the process of social differentiation in the countryside and thus acted as
safeguards of stability. He suggested that reducing tax burdens, promoting the migration
of peasants to sparsely populated regions, and permitting them to rent land owned by the
state or the gentry would promote stability much more effectively than radical attempts to
demolish communal institutions.179
In addition to intensifying social problems, Kovalevskii maintained, a radical land
reform would fail to ensure significant economic improvement. Peasants would be
reluctant to accept any innovations that put their livelihood at risk. Kovalevskii reminded
Russian politicians that it took centuries in Western Europe to transform peasants into
individual farmers. In Russia, it would also take a long time to change the peasants'
economic behavior. Capitalist farmers could not instantly emerge from the constraints of
the commune. The peasants could not miraculously acquire the skills and knowledge
necessary to successful entrepreneurship by the simple act of leaving the commune. He
cited evidence from India, Algeria, and the Spanish colonies in Latin America
demonstrating that the disappearance of the commune in these regions did not generate
any significant improvements in farming and even caused a short-term economic decline.
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He also referred to Russian zemstvo surveys revealing that many peasants who
consolidated their lands into individual otruba and khutora continued to employ the same
tools and farming methods that they had become accustomed to in communes.
Kovalevskii accused government officials of using administrative pressure in order to
force peasants to leave the commune. Believing that the process of land privatization
must be exclusively voluntary, he urged the political elites to abandon their traditional
paternalistic and dirigiste attitudes toward the allegedly “backward” peasantry and to let
the peasants decide for themselves whether to stay in the commune or to separate from it.
He reminded Russian policy-makers that peasants possessed sufficient expertise and
pragmatism to be able to make informed economic decisions. Regarding peasants as
actors in the reform process rather than passive recipients of state-directed reform, he
argued that peasants desired economic improvement and knew better than the St.
Petersburg officials how to reform the village.
Finally, Kovalevskii criticized the authors of the Stolypin land reform for focusing
exclusively on land-tenure issues and presenting the communal system as the single
source of all rural problems. Asserting that changes in land ownership could not provide
the ultimate solution to peasant poverty, he urged agrarian reformers to concentrate their
efforts on such issues as increasing capital investment in the agricultural sector,
developing rural infrastructure, building roads and communications, improving housing
and public health conditions, and providing agronomic assistance to peasants. Moreover,
Kovalevskii emphasized, farming and technological improvements could be implemented
without any change in land tenure arrangements. He drew attention to the capacity of
communal peasants to introduce innovations just as rapidly and effectively as individual
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farmers. In his opinion, both the private and communal sectors of Russian agriculture
could equally contribute to rural progress.
Could communal egalitarianism prevent the growth of social and economic
differentiation among peasants? Or were opponents of the commune correct in arguing
that collective mechanisms in the village declined to the extent that it was no longer
possible to consider the commune a safeguard of social harmony and stability?
Kovalevskii's answers to these questions were not simple. As we have already noted, he
repeatedly stressed the growth of individualism and economic stratification in the
commune and, at the same time, believed that communal practices could prevent the
excesses of economic differentiation.
Recent research has provided evidence in support of Kovalevskii's complex vision of
communal egalitarianism. Communes were by no means model egalitarian societies, as
some Slavophile and populist intellectuals argued. In fact, economic inequality has
always been a common feature of communal life. Numerous accounts documented the
existence of wide disparities in peasants' wealth and economic status. Differences in
households' farming ability, family size, fertility of holdings, and many other factors
contributed to different economic outcomes. The fundamentally egalitarian practices such
as repartition could in reality promote inequalities. Wealthier households might benefit
from the fact that repartitions, while redistributing land allotments, very rarely addressed
the inequalities in livestock and garden holdings. The expanding economic opportunities
of the post-Emancipation period only intensified the existing disparities. This was clearly
manifested by the increase in conflicts between peasant families and the growing
influence of rich peasants on village affairs. Frequently, the wealthier families were able
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to affect the votes and decisions of the village assembly and to exert economic pressures
on their poorer co-villagers who depended on them financially due to indebtedness or
worked for them as hired laborers. Not surprisingly, commune members often referred to
wealthy peasants pejoratively as miroedy (literally “commune-eaters”).180
Despite increasing peasant stratification in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, communal practices did continue to serve as an effective counter-balance to
excessive economic differentiation. Communes mediated disputes between households
and organized assistance for the families suffering from a sudden economic crisis. A
household experiencing extreme material difficulties could be temporarily freed from
some or all of its tax obligations, be allowed to defer payments, or receive an interest-free
loan. Communes could help a family to rebuild a house destroyed by fire or flood or even
assist in plowing or harvesting its land allotment in case of a family member's illness. As
evidence indicates, mutual aid continued to be a common practice among turn-of-thecentury Russian peasants.181
Although critics regarded peasants' collectivism and cooperation as a manifestation of
their primitive egalitarian instincts, peasants themselves understood them in purely
pragmatic terms. Through generations of experience, they realized that providing mutual
aid and maintaining some degree of egalitarianism served their interests better than
seeking their own advantage at the expense of others. By ensuring the subsistence of each
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family in the village, communal practices prevented excessive impoverishment and
destitution. In the absence of the organized social welfare system, cooperation performed
the functions of mutual insurance policy. During hard times, the commune acted as a
defense mechanism allowing rich and poor peasants to band together to survive during
famines or to protect themselves against the excessive demands of the state. As Dorothy
Atkinson noted, “the conditions of rural life gave rise to a social concept of
egalitarianism, not as a ‘Utopian illusion’ but as a practical and culturally conditioned
adjustment to limited resources.”182
Since the principle of joint financial responsibility required commune members to
make up the difference for the households that failed to pay their share of taxes, it made
perfect economic sense to provide temporary relief to families in crisis so they could
recover as soon as possible and be able again to make their contribution to the commune's
obligations. Peasants also offered assistance not to abstract individuals but to their fellow
villagers, whom they knew well and whose help they expected to receive reciprocally at
times of need. In that respect, mutual aid practices served as a pragmatic group survival
mechanism.
This does not mean, however, that the commune acted as a safety net for everybody.
Well aware of the possibility that egalitarian benefits might allow “free-riders” to take
advantage of the other villagers, peasants were very selective in providing assistance to
their less fortunate neighbors. Typically, a temporary crisis due to a natural disaster, an
accident like fire, or a family member's serious illness could qualify a household for
communal help. Those who continuously failed to be productive village members,
particularly of alcoholism or laziness proved to be the cause of the problem, had very
182
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little or no chances to receive neighborly support. Moreover, communal assemblies
punished repeated instances of tax evasion by fines, arrest, or even property
confiscation.183
The realities of peasant life and economy were far too complex to fit a single-factor
explanation. Contrary to the political elites' unconditional belief in the “magic of
property,” tenure changes could not provide the ultimate solution to all problems in the
Russian countryside. Scholars have stressed that transition from subsistence to marketoriented economy requires large-scale social and economic transformations, of which
tenure forms are only a part. In fact, evidence from various regions of the world indicates
that land privatization by itself does not necessarily lead to significant agricultural
improvement. While Stolypin and his supporters referred to England as a model of
successful agricultural reform, historians of English agriculture have repeatedly
questioned the results of the land enclosures. Many studies have demonstrated that
enclosures in England did not always foster improvements in husbandry. In both open
and enclosed fields, peasants continued to use the same outmoded farming techniques.184
The Russian economist Aleksandr S. Posnikov, Kovalevskii's contemporary and an
expert in rural economics, argued that changes in property rights did not always correlate
with productivity increase and agricultural innovation. His findings demonstrated that
English tenant farmers improved their farming methods and productivity despite the fact
that they did not own the land they worked. Temporary rental contracts did not diminish
their economic incentive to invest time and money. Posnikov concluded that factors other
than property arrangements determine the dynamics of productivity growth and overall
183
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agricultural progress. Another Kovalevskii's contemporary, the statistician-economist
Nikolai A. Kablukov pointed to the rapidly declining levels of productivity and
innovation among late nineteenth-century English private farmers. He found that, instead
of intensifying land-use regimes and diversifying their crops, large farm owners
responded to market fluctuations by resorting to cheaper and more primitive cultivation
methods, which resulted in soil degeneration and even the abandonment of arable fields
to grazing.185
Similarly, local surveys indicated little or no correlation between tenure arrangements
and economic initiative. A survey in the Simbirsk province, for example, revealed that
only fifteen percent of privatizers sought to enclose their land with the purpose of
improving their farming operations. The surveys by the Free Economic Society found no
difference in the use of agricultural techniques between communal peasants and
individual farmers. Peasants who privatized their lands often retained the same farming
methods that they had employed in the commune. In some cases, they continued to use
strip cultivation and even agreed to shift the location of their strips when the remaining
members of the commune undertook a land repartition. On the other hand, when
improvements occurred, they took place on both communal and private farms. No
compelling evidence suggests that individual farmers adopted advanced techniques or
equipment at a faster rate than did their neighbors in the commune.186
Comparisons of productivity rates in the communal and private sectors of Russian
agriculture also do not provide any conclusive evidence of a better economic
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performance on privatized farms. Bideleux, for instance, has found no evidence of the
advantages of private farming in turn-of-the-century Russia. His analysis of regional
variations in rates of grain yields increase shows that regions and provinces with
predominantly communal agriculture could have both the lowest and highest increases in
yields. Grain productivity levels in the predominantly communal central black-earth
regions did not deviate significantly from the average rates for all regions. Most of the
individual farmers who did achieve higher grain yields appear to have been stronger
households, who had been receiving above average yields before they privatized their
land holdings.187
Numerous factors unrelated to land tenure played a greater role in peasant poverty
than allegedly backward communal practices. Shortage of capital, lack of infrastructure,
weakly developed markets, little access to existing markets because of poor roads and
communication, as well as, of course, such factors as low living standards, unsatisfactory
housing conditions, the poor quality of medical care, and low literacy rates, produced
deleterious effects on Russian agriculture. Russian peasants did not enjoy the benefits of
public health care services that ordinary people experienced in other European countries.
As a result, infant mortality rates in Russia, which in 1861 did not differ much from those
in Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, remained unchanged until 1900, whereas in the
other countries they had declined significantly.188 Inadequate infrastructure and
communications discouraged peasants from setting up a separate farm far away from a
village, where they could regularly attend a church and send their children to school.
Many feared the inevitable social isolation of the life in a farmstead. The global

187
188

Bideleux, “Agricultural Advance,” 201-203; Kerans, Mind and Labor, 365.
Gregory, Before Command, 22-23.

109

agricultural depression of the 1880s-1890s affected the peasant economy by significantly
reducing grain prices. The state, however, instead of encouraging capital investment and
expanding financial and agronomic assistance to the most poverty-stricken rural regions,
further increased tax burdens on peasants in order to finance its ambitious
industrialization and railroad construction programs. Characteristically, Kovalevskii
repeatedly criticized the government for its short-sighted policy of modernizing Russia's
economy at the expense of agriculture.
Some historians have linked the relatively low productivity on peasant lands to the
terms of the Emancipation, which allowed gentry owners to retain the best-quality land in
their possession and apportion less productive sections to communes. Landlords did not
give up their top-quality lands even when they were located in the midst of peasant
holdings. The fact that gentry lands were often closer to the village, whereas peasants had
to travel considerable distances to their allotments, also affected productivity. In the
decades following the reform, gentry owners increasingly sold portions of their land to
communal peasants, but, again, these lands typically had lower potential for productivity
improvement than those that the gentry kept to themselves. In addition, to compensate the
gentry for the loss of labor and land as a result of the Emancipation, the government
frequently established redemption payments above market value. Consequently, peasants
received less land and more financial and fiscal obligations than before the
Emancipation.189
Finally, unfavorable climatic, geographical, and environmental conditions could
considerably limit the scope of economic improvement. Peasants developed elaborate
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strategies to cope with the environments they lived in. In the absence of modern
technology, however, the possibilities for improvement were limited. Weather
fluctuations, environmental changes, and other random natural factors over which
peasants had no control continued to influence peasant farming choices and economic
decision-making. A recent study, for instance, has shown that the prevailing conditions in
the central black-earth provinces simply did not allow for the spread of multi-field
systems. In many regions, the sparse distribution of water resources, meadows, and
forests created unfavorable conditions for the formation of separated farms.190
One of the crucial factors that bureaucrats had traditionally ignored was the peasants'
willingness and ability to contribute to rural reform. Blinded by their elitist attitudes
toward the peasantry, officials could not admit that peasant economic behavior could be
rational or innovative. Peasant culture and interests seemed to them “grey” and
unremarkable. A conviction that allegedly “backward” and “apathetic” peasants needed
tutelage and direction from above led Russian reformers to rely on paternalism as the
most effective rural policy.
Although it is hard to measure precisely the scope of peasants' intelligence and
agronomic expertise, many observers have stressed peasant pragmatism and sharpmindedness (smekalka).191 Russian rural studies of the post-Emancipation period pointed
to economic interest as the dominant factor in peasant behavior. The peasant came to be
seen as essentially an economic actor who “struggled with the Russian soil and climate in
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an effort to master the land rather than be mastered by it.”192 The influential economist
Nikolai Bervi, for example, concluded that, provided with better access to technology and
education, peasants could themselves play a leading role in the improvement of Russian
agriculture.193
As social and cultural history flourished in the second half of the twentieth century,
historians began to “rediscover” the role of the peasantry in the technological change.
Peasants are now credited with a more active role in introducing innovations than has
been previously perceived. Following anthropologists and sociologists, historians have
abandoned the notion of peasant primitivism and irrationalism. Peasant culture is no
longer seen as rigid and stagnant, but flexible and complex. Scholars have increasingly
stressed that custom and tradition did not prevent peasants from choosing what they
thought suited them best. Communal practices and customs “allowed for an adaptation so
spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived.”194
Likewise, Russian peasants are now seen not as merely passive subjects but as active
participants in the process of change. Whereas earlier works focused primarily on the
static and authoritarian aspects of peasant culture,195 recent studies have stressed the
pragmatic nature and flexibility of peasant mentality and behavior. Based on data
gathered by Russian zemstvo statisticians, recent works have demonstrated the peasants'
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continuous efforts to modify traditional farming strategies and devise new ones. It has
been shown that in most cases peasants acted independently, without any outside help.
Sometimes, zemstvo specialists assisted them in adopting innovations. Overall,
communal peasants responded to innovations with the same degree of enthusiasm and
appreciation as individual farmers. In the 1880s, two decades before the inception of the
Stolypin reform, communes in the western Russian provinces started spontaneous
consolidations of their strips into unified plots (voloki), similar to the enclosed farms
(otruba) suggested by Stolypin.196
In contrast to the elitist vision of peasants as a “grey mass” of mindless primitives
suffering from a “culture deficit,” a vast body of evidence indicates that Russian peasants
possessed a complex and rich culture of their own. As one expert wrote, “peasants did not
need to wait for outsiders to fill the void in the lives with meaning. Despite widespread
illiteracy and the low level of technological achievements, peasants did not seem to lack
useful and practical knowledge, motivation, or images of well-being and public
virtue.”197 Although typically unaware of latest scientific discoveries and innovations,
peasants developed extensive agronomic knowledge and skills. Repartitions alone
involved complex land surveying procedures that required a detailed knowledge of soil
fertility, local topography, accessibility, drainage, and many other agronomic and
environmental factors. Characteristically, local agronomists who dealt with peasants on a
regular basis attributed the peasants' ignorance to the lack of specialized education rather
than their inability to comprehend rational economic principles.198
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Collective practices did not represent merely static “relics” of the past, but continued
to serve important and pragmatic functions. They reflected the interests and worldview of
the peasants, helping them to defend themselves against the pressures of the environment
they lived in. They bound peasants together in a complex web of economic, social, and
legal relationships. They transmitted the collective wisdom, expertise, and experience,
which not only offered tried and trusted ways of survival but also fostered, if not
required, adaptation and change. Modernization processes occurred in Russian postEmancipation agriculture not simply because of the involvement of the elites. Peasants
themselves took an active part in shaping rural change.199
Critics cited indifference and even antagonism to children's education as one of the
most illustrative examples of peasants' low intellectual horizons. In reality, long before
zemstvos started establishing village schools, peasants had organized and maintained
their own informal “free schools” (vol'nye shkoly) taught by local priests or retired
soldiers. Viewed by peasants in purely pragmatic terms, reading and writing skills offered
important advantages. The ability to read documents was necessary to avoid being
cheated by local bureaucrats or traders. Innovation-minded peasants appreciated the
opportunity to learn about agricultural improvements. In many villages, local agronomists
encountered “peasant-intellectuals” who read agronomic literature.200
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This explains why village and district authorities, not the peasants, often resisted
peasant literacy, fearing that it would give villagers too much freedom and enable them to
keep track of bureaucratic operations. Not surprisingly, when the government launched
the rural educational reform in the 1880s, peasants displayed suspicion toward the state's
attempts to replace old informal village schools with formal schools operated by local
zemstvos and with a uniform curriculum approved from above. They did have all
practical reasons to see such educational changes as another attempt on the part of the
state to control peasants' behavior and culture. Despite the general distrust of the stateimposed measures, however, peasants were typically respectful of teachers. Although
they might have regarded zemstvo school teachers as cultural outsiders, they knew that,
unlike bureaucrats, teachers did not have formal authority to coerce and command. Most
importantly, teachers taught literacy, which every peasant recognized as useful, if not
necessary.201
Commonly accused of the lack of understanding of private property rights, peasants in
reality could clearly distinguish between private and collective property arrangements.
They held to communal practices not because of their inability to comprehend a modern
conception of private property and the advantages it offered, as it was commonly thought,
but because they believed that the communal system served their interests better than
individual farming. As we have seen, the commune allowed for economic flexibility by
permitting peasants to own private garden plots and to buy or rent additional arable land
when needed. Peasants cherished their communal allotments but also appreciated the
Roger Bartlett (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 341, 351-352; Kerans, Mind and Labor, 399;
Kingston-Mann, “Peasant Economy,” 9.
201
For a detailed discussion of peasant attitudes toward zemstvo schools and teachers, see Ben Eklof,
Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914 (Berkeley,
Calif.: University of California Press, 1986).

115

value of property acquired by purchase and the advantages associated with it. The
communal system did not thus prevent peasants from understanding private property
rights and, of course, did not promote disrespect for private property, as its critics
insisted. On the contrary, the commune offered its members an opportunity to benefit
from both collective and private property arrangements. Undoubtedly, compared to their
counterparts in Western Europe, Russian peasants may have had a weaker understanding
and appreciation of private property. This applied, however, to all strata of Russian
society. The notion of private property and legal support for it had been traditionally less
developed in Russia than elsewhere in Europe.202
It is true that peasants often disapproved of their neighbors who decided to consolidate
their holdings and separate from the commune. This was due, however, not to the
peasants' alleged innate hostility toward private property, but to the economic problems
they experienced as a result of consolidations. Each separation led to the reduction of the
commune's arable and common grazing land and, consequently, to significantly
decreased fodder resources for those who stayed in the commune. Peasants were also
dissatisfied when they were forced to relocate some of their best-quality land strips to
make room for consolidated plots for separators. As Kerans has suggested, it was the
sense of private property that could discourage peasants from forming a separate
farmstead. Moving to a khutor meant selling the household's individual garden plot,
which many peasants valued as much as the communal allotment of arable land.203
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Convinced that peasants were incapable of change, officials believed the state needed
to assume the directing role in rural transformation. The peasants’ unwillingness to
follow the state-led reform was simply dismissed as a sign of peasant backwardness.
Coercive policies could thus be employed when needed and were accepted as a necessary
element of the “civilizing process.” The use of force was justified as a means to achieve
the goal of promoting the triumph of reason and science over peasant backwardness.204
Historians disagree in their evaluations of the scope of coercion used by the authorities
to accelerate peasant participation in the Stolypin reform. All, however, agree that the
government did pressure land captains and other local administrators to push peasants to
consolidate and privatize their lands. Despite the fact that many peasants were
particularly hostile to the idea of khutora, local bureaucrats pressured peasants to arrange
khutora, not otruba, whenever possible. In addition to extra-legal coercion, they might
offer generous financial assistance to cover the costs of relocating to new sites.205
The Stolypin reform thus represented an example of the reform from above, an
attempt of the government to impose its own vision of progress while ignoring the
alternative reform projects suggested by zemstvo experts and peasants themselves.
Characteristically, the sources that Stolypin and his supporters used as evidence of the
commune's inefficiency were often produced by government officials themselves.
Frequently, bureaucrats manipulated this information. For example, the data gathered by
the Valuev Commission in the 1870s were based exclusively on the testimony of local
bureaucrats and gentry representatives. Contemporary commentators questioned the
reliability of the Commission's report and strongly criticized Valuev, the Minister of State
204
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Properties widely known as an opponent of the commune, for deliberately excluding
direct peasant testimony.206
Desiring to transform the village, the Russian government never intended to allow
“initiative from below,” particularly initiative from the peasants, who presumably needed
guidance from above. The reform's authors failed to understand that the peasants might
have their own economic rationality and their own understanding of the costs and
benefits of different land arrangements. The measure that peasants favored most during
the Stolypin reform, the so-called group land settlement (gruppovoe zemleustroistvo), did
not require any tenure changes but did help to reduce the worst effects of inter-stripping.
Nearly half of all peasant requests in 1906-1914 involved such group settlements. Despite
its appeal to the peasants, the government gave this type of change low priority, turning
down applications for it and allowing it only after more radical solutions proved to be
impossible. The government was determined to eliminate communes, not to improve
them.207
Importantly, local resistance to the Stolypin reform came not only from peasants,
but from zemstvo specialists, who were well aware of the commune's capacity to
introduce innovations. Despite the government's attempts to pressure the zemstvos into
providing special assistance exclusively to consolidated and privatized farms, zemstvo
experts refused to focus their efforts on the small minority of consolidators, but insisted
on extending agronomic aid and training to all peasants including those living in the
communes. In fact, zemstvo specialists argued that, due to the lack of agronomists and
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resources, it was more practical to arrange agronomic assistance to communal villages
rather than to individual farmers. The widespread collaboration between zemstvo experts
and communal peasants became a sort of a grass-roots alternative to the Stolypin land
reform. Zemstvo specialists preferred to provide technical and agronomic aid to village
communes, where they could help to a greater number of peasants within a relatively
short period of time. Reaching out peasants who separated from the commune,
particularly otrubniki frequently living in remote areas, required more specialists and
more time, which often presented a serious problem for local zemstvo organizations. The
lack of agricultural experts, as well as of financial and technical resources, made it
extremely difficult to assist every individual farmer.208
As disappointment with the Stolypin reform grew among peasants, zemstvo activities
expanded even more actively. Relying on the “magic of property”, the government made
little effort to provide agronomic assistance to individual farmers. The authors of the
reform appeared to have expected an agricultural revolution to occur instantly once
farmers privatized their lands. The only financial assistance provided by the state
included coverage of peasants' expenses on moving their dwellings to new locations.
Officials ignored the necessity of arranging agronomic instruction, equipment stores, and
animal-breeding services for consolidators. Inevitably, this led to widespread economic
failures among consolidators all over the country.209
Zemstvo agronomists assisted communal peasants by distributing agronomic
literature, offering lectures, and organizing discussions of agronomic issues at village
meetings. They advised and consulted peasants individually, set up experimental stations,
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where peasants could see advanced tools and techniques in action, managed equipmentlending stations, supervised peasant experiments with new tools, farming techniques, or
crops on specially designated demonstration plots. By seeking to promote technological
change in the communes, the zemstvos inevitably came to challenge the government's
program of reform. Unlike state officials, zemstvo agronomists saw their main goal in
working through existing institutions, not in uprooting the farmer from the village and
turning him into individualistic yeomen. Characteristically, local agronomists generally
opposed Stolypin's over-emphasis on privatization measures.210
As an alternative to land consolidation and privatization favored by the government,
zemstvo agronomists suggested a number of effective improvement measures within the
framework of the commune. Decreasing the number of furlongs, or komassatsiia, for
example, could help reduce the negative effects of land fragmentation by widening strips
while at the same time allowing the retention of the benefits of common grazing. Another
measure called “group land organization” could ease the problem of distant and
inaccessible lands by forming out-settlements from over-sized communes. According to
Kerans, local zemstvo agronomists in the Tambov province preferred group land
organizations over consolidations. In March 1912, the agronomic conference in the
Tambov province passed a resolution approving group land organization projects. The
state officials, on the other hand, strongly opposed such measures. It was only in 1913
that the Ministry of Agriculture began admitting the effectiveness of group land
organization, thus breaking the Ministry of Internal Affairs' pressure to emphasize
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consolidations. Such discord among the two ministries, however, did not change the
government's overall policy stressing the consolidation and privatization of land.211
It is important to note that the government's distrust of the peasantry—and of zemstvo
specialists who advocated the peasants’ rights—reflected its general distrust of Russian
society as a whole, its traditional desire to exercise control over every aspect of public
life in almost a military fashion. The Stolypin land reform represented essentially a
radical attempt on the part of the government to create the “well-ordered” rural society in
a rapidly changing world. Restoring and enhancing order in the largest sector of the
Russian economy was crucial to the survival of the tsarist regime, weakened by the defeat
in the Russo-Japanese war, the revolutionary chaos of 1905, and the challenges of the
new constitutional system.
Whereas state officials claimed that the land reform was liberating peasants from the
constraints imposed on them by the commune, it was in fact the government that was
imposing on peasants its elitist vision of the reform. In contrast to the classical liberal
assertion that private property rights enhance personal freedom and independence,
Russian political elites had quite different goals in mind when they initiated land
privatization programs. For Stolypin, the primary goal of the land reform was to create a
class of obedient and loyal citizens in the countryside. Earlier, Count Illarion I.
Vorontsov-Dashkov, Minister of the Imperial Court and a member of the State Council,
advocated the extension of private land tenure as a measure limiting rather than fostering
peasant freedom of action. Like the English proponents of enclosure, who saw one of the
dangers of communal practices in peasants' self-reliance and independence from
authorities, Vorontsov-Dashkov blamed the Russian village commune for its “excessively
211
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democratic” features, which, in his mind, undermined peasants' respect for authority.
Similarly, many state officials favored the destruction of the commune as a means to
reinforce the loyalty and subordination of the peasantry to the authorities in the face of
the increasing influence of political radicalism in Russian society.212
Russian government's approach to reform was in many ways reminiscent of
eighteenth-century German rulers who, inspired by the Cameralist theory of a wellordered police-state, sought to replace the “irrational” practices of the peasant commune
with “rational” bureaucratic controls of the state. Viewing the commune as an obstacle to
the expansion of state power, German political elites denounced it as a hindrance to
economic progress. Land privatization came to be seen as a part of the “rationalization”
of the entire social order, which, in the opinion of German rulers, justified the use of
force when peasants resisted improvement measures imposed from above. During the
reign of Frederick the Great, for example, peasants could be subject to corporal
punishment if they refused to grow recommended crops. Ironically, Russian elites did not
recognize such actions as constraints on individual freedom. Influenced by the statist
economic traditions of Germany, Russian rulers themselves readily used coercion to
enforce peasant loyalty and compliance.213
The results of the reform revealed the government's misconceptions and
miscalculations about rural realities. According to official figures, between 1906 and
1914, about 25 percent of all peasant households left the commune, including 10 percent
of those who consolidated their lands and the other 15 percent who withdrew without
consolidating. Contrary to the government's expectations, only a small percentage of the
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strongest households consolidated and privatized their lands. Wealthier peasants could
buy their own land or rent additional holdings without leaving the commune.
Entrepreneurial individuals had a chance to open a store in the village, operate a windmill
or a threshing machine, or simply live off interest on loans to fellow villagers. If they
wanted to try a new crop or an advanced farming technique, they could do so on some of
their non-communal lands. In some cases, a big household could arrange for one of the
sons to separate and thus enjoy the advantage of both having an otrub on the side and
maintaining communal benefits, particularly the right to common grazing of livestock.214
In many cases, it was not the most prosperous, but the poorest and smallest villages
that requested village-wide consolidations. As a rule, these villages contained many
failing households, with extremely small land holdings. Conversely, larger villages
resisted land consolidation, because this would have made it inevitable for some
households to accept a plot far away from their home. Many of those who consolidated
their lands never completely cut off their ties with the commune. Wealthy peasants could
accumulate large private land holdings by buying the consolidated plots from weaker
farmers, but at the same preferred to retain their original communal allotments so they
could continue to enjoy the right to common grazing. Overall, more than a half of the
consolidators kept at least a portion of their communal allotments in order to remain
eligible to communal benefits. Even more strikingly, neighboring individual farmers
sometimes “simulated” communal arrangements by coordinating their sowing and
farming operations so that to allow common herd grazing on the arable land. Many
individual farmers continued to practice common grazing, subdivided their holdings into
strips during family divisions, and even undertook land repartitions with their neighbors
214

Kerans, Mind and Labor, 357-358; Pallot, “Development,” 84.

123

as they had in the communes. One of the most devastating effects of forced privatization
was the creation of a large amount of ineffective individual farms. Purchasers of
consolidated plots often found themselves in a desperate situation when they realized
that, even with the loans from the Peasant Land Bank, they lacked financial resources to
relocate their dwellings, pay for their plots, and reorganize their farming operations at the
same time.215
As we can see, substantial evidence corroborates Kovalevskii’s thesis that, due to its
misplaced focus, the Stolypin land reform failed to reform Russian agriculture. Instead of
addressing the numerous issues hindering economic improvement in the countryside, the
Russian leadership concentrated its efforts on eliminating the village commune as the
only source of peasant poverty and other rural problems. Ignoring the economic potential
of the existing communal institutions, the government chose to destroy them.
Kovalevskii’s assessment of the Stolypin land reform fits in the concept of “repressive
modernization” suggested by modern scholars.216 The tsarist government used the reform
to strengthen the power of the state. Moreover, the reform represented essentially a
radical project of social engineering, an attempt to fashion a “well-ordered” peasant
society according a preconceived plan of rural progress, a plan that was largely based on
abstract economic theories and general cultural assumptions rather than on systematic
empirical studies. In that respect, the reform represented an example of “administrative
utopia,”217 based on the government's narrow—and in many respects utopian—vision of
rural transformation, which inevitably resulted in its very limited practical impact on the
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peasant economy. Its goal was not only to transform the rural economy but also to change
peasants' mentality and value system. As Kovalevskii’s analysis has demonstrated, the
Stolypin land reform failed to realize these goals.
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Conclusion

Kovalevskii’s analysis demonstrates that, despite their ancient origins, both communal
forms—the patriarchal family and the village commune—had survived well into the early
twentieth century in Russia. Both types of the commune represented dynamic institutions
that changed over time. Despite the predominance of collective elements, both the family
commune and the village commune experienced the growth of individualism within their
framework. The fundamental difference between them was that, while the family
commune was rapidly decaying in post-Emancipation Russia, the village commune
retained its social and economic viability and displayed the signs of significant economic
potential. Kovalevskii criticized the authors of the Stolypin land reform for ignoring the
evidence of the village commune’s capacity to contribute to economic progress and
attempting to destroy communal institutions by legislative fiat.
Kovalevskii's scholarship deserves to be praised for its distinctly scientific qualities.
His efforts to minimize political bias distinguished him strikingly from many other
Russian thinkers. Unlike the majority of Russian intellectuals, he built up his theories not
on political considerations but on a balanced, detailed, and meticulously documented
study of social, political, and economic institutions. He therefore became one of the first
Russian social scientists, in the true meaning of the word.
The scope of Kovalevskii's scholarship distinguished him as well. As a historian, he
investigated a variety of political, social, economic, legal, and cultural issues. In addition,
he was recognized as a prominent sociologist, political scientist, legal expert,
anthropologist, and ethnographer. The geographical scope of his studies was also
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impressive, as he was one of the first historians in Russia and Europe to use records and
sources from virtually all continents and historical periods in his comparative and crosscultural research. In many cases, he worked with documents that had never attracted
scholarly attention before. He pioneered the application of statistical techniques in
historical research. Finally, he relied on his own ethnographic field work in his analysis.
Historians of Russia have long recognized the contributions of Vorontsov, Chuprov,
Posnikov, Chelintsev, and Chaianov to our understanding of the peasant economy and
culture. Kovalevskii's studies of the peasantry, however, remain largely unappreciated
and misunderstood. Historians have particular difficulty conceptualizing and
contextualizing Kovalevskii's views of the Russian village commune. They found it hard
to reconcile his positivist belief in the universal laws of historical progress, according to
which rural communes would inevitably decline and give way to private farms, with his
criticism of Stolypin's attempts to destroy communal institutions in Russia. It seems
contradictory that a convinced liberal and an advocate of private property rights such as
Kovalevskii could oppose the land privatization reform and defend the traditional
communal practices of Russian peasants.
This study has attempted to demonstrate that Kovalevskii's understanding of the
Russian village commune remained remarkably consistent throughout his academic
career. In accordance with the positivist idea of unilinear progress, he accepted the notion
that private agriculture would eventually replace traditional collective farming
everywhere in the world. Unlike many other positivists, however, he extended the
concept of progress to include traditional communal institutions as well. In his
comparative studies of communal forms, he argued that communal practices also changed
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over time, progressing from simple forms to more complex and advanced ones. For
Kovalevskii, adaptation and change constituted integral parts of the communal economy.
At the time when Stolypin was attempting to destroy the village commune, it possessed a
significant economic potential, which led Kovalevskii to conclude that it should have
been supported, instead of being undermined, so that it could continue to contribute to
economic progress in the Russian countryside. As paradoxical as it may seem, such an
unconventional positivist analysis of agriculture remained consistent with Comte's wellknown contention that human societies develop from simple to more complex forms. The
greater the complexity of social phenomena, the more they admit modification. Thus,
Kovalevskii considered it perfectly logical to apply this developmental scheme to peasant
societies and to assume that the village commune could also progress from simpler to
more advanced forms.
Kovalevskii's analysis also challenged common assumptions about tradition and
change, which are often regarded as antagonistic forces in the historical process. He was
one of the first social scientists to argue that these two categories appear not as mutually
exclusive but as inseparable and even complementary. In fact, they exist in a dialectical
relationship, interacting permanently and beneficially. Tradition emerges not as
anachronism or transmission of outdated knowledge but as the heritage that continues to
hold value, as the collective wisdom of the past that has full contemporary legitimacy and
relevance. Moreover, Kovalevskii stresses the adaptive and dynamic nature of traditional
practices. Inherent in human history, change represents an integral part of traditional
institutions, not just an attribute of modernity.

128

Drawing on this notion of tradition and change, Kovalevskii urged Russian policymakers to move from a static vision of traditional peasant institutions to a more dynamic
consideration of their social and economic potential. He repeatedly pointed to Stolypin's
failure to recognize the innovative potential of the village commune, which, according to
Kovalevskii, would inevitably lead to the failure to modernize Russia's agriculture. He
warned the Russian government that it was making a fatal mistake by seeking to destroy
traditional communal institutions instead of incorporating them into the reform process.
As we have seen, such an interpretation of the “tradition versus innovation” dichotomy
radically differed from the prevailing visions of progress among Kovalevskii's
contemporaries. Remarkably, it anticipated the understanding of tradition and change that
historians began articulating only in the last decades of the twentieth century. Recent
studies of economic development in the Third-World countries have legitimized this
analysis.218 The controversy continues until today, and the assertions that tradition and
modernity are not necessarily conflicting forces are still being perceived by many as
revisionist, if not revolutionary.
Kovalevskii defined the meanings of the “traditional” and the “modern” in their
specific historical and cultural context. While acknowledging the theoretical validity of
the “modern” notion of advantages of private over communal land ownership, he warned
that this notion might be inapplicable to a particular situation in a particular society. The
actual operations of both traditional and modern institutions varied significantly in
different historical contexts. In early twentieth-century Russia, he argued, traditional
communal institutions successfully adopted modern techniques, just as allegedly
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“modern” private farms continued to hold to traditional practices. The imposition of
“modern” private land tenure, he stressed, would not automatically elevate the economic
efficiency of agricultural production to the “modern” level.
Kovalevskii arrived at such conclusions on the basis of empirical studies by Russian
economists, agronomists, and zemstvo statisticians, as well as his own comparative
historical research. This comparative approach not only determined his attitude toward
the commune and the Stolypin land reform, but also confirmed his reservations about the
positivist concept of unilinear progress. Although he agreed in principle with the general
postulates of the evolutionary doctrine as outlined by Comte and Spencer, he emphasized
great variations in the course and manifestations of progress in different societies
depending on the political, socioeconomic, cultural, demographic, and environmental
conditions. Aware of the increasing skepticism toward the positivist idea of progress
among late nineteenth-century intellectuals, he in fact contributed to its criticisms and
revisions. He regretted “the unfortunate dominance of the organic theory of society”219
and criticized scholars who uncritically accepted the notion of unilinear evolution as
taking place uniformly in all societies. Moreover, in his late works, he preferred to
describe the historical process in terms of social change rather than social progress. In
opposition to the widespread misconception that “evolution always tends to the cure of
social ills and to the growth of public welfare,”220 he called for a broader and more
particularistic understanding of historical progress than that of the founding fathers of
positivism. As much as he admired England and its achievements, he rejected the idea
that Russia should emulate English political and economic institutions. He encouraged

219
220

Kovalevskii, Sotsiologiia (St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1910), vol. 1,261.
Kovalevskii, Sovremennye sotsiologi (St. Petersburg: L.F. Panteleev, 1905), 286.

130

Russian leaders to learn important lessons from England's historical experience,
especially from the mistakes of forcible enclosures, but insisted at the same time that it
was primarily Russia's own historical and cultural context that determined what progress
meant for Russian society.
These aspects of Kovalevskii's thought suggest a much more varied picture of
positivism than it is commonly assumed. They allow us to speak of a variety of schools
of thought within positivism. Characteristically, Kovalevskii himself never perceived
positivism as a strict dogma but rather as a mode of thinking or a general intellectual
orientation that could produce different intellectual results when applied to different
phenomena. Positivist rationalism implied critical approach to any theory, including
positivism itself, which justified its constant revisions and re-evaluations by positivist
thinkers themselves, not only by its critics. In fact, as we know, positivist scholars
differed greatly in their interpretations of the key concepts of positivism. Kovalevskii was
no exception. The simplistic picture of positivism generated by its numerous critics does
not reflect the complexity and diversity of positivist thought.
Kovalevskii's example challenges much of the conventional knowledge about Russian
liberalism and its responses to social and economic problems in late imperial Russia. It is
commonly believed that Russian liberal thinkers and politicians unconditionally
supported land privatization as an essential component of rural modernization. Petr B.
Struve and Boris N. Chicherin, for example, enthusiastically advocated the destruction of
peasant communal institutions. The case of Kovalevskii, however, demonstrates that
liberal visions of rural modernization were much more nuanced. His liberal convictions
did not prevent him from criticizing the Russian government for attempting to impose
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private landownership by legislative fiat. As we have seen, he repeatedly emphasized that
the accelerated destruction of the village commune would result in the massive
impoverishment of the peasantry and, instead of promoting stability, would lead to a
nation-wide social and economic crisis.
Because of such assertions, which diverged from classical liberal thought, one might
reasonably doubt Kovalevskii's commitment to liberalism. In fact, some scholars have
stressed the importance of populist and Marxist ideas in shaping his critique of the
Stolypin land reform.221 A close look at his European contemporaries, however, reveals
that such views were becoming increasingly common among liberal thinkers and
politicians of that time. They reflected the transition in late nineteenth-century European
liberal thought from laissez-faire capitalism to more socially-oriented strategies of
economic development. The mounting social problems caused by the Industrial
Revolution prompted European liberals to favor the welfare state. This new type of
liberalism recognized the importance of a more balanced distribution of wealth as a
guarantor of stability in a democratic society. Disturbed by the prospect of revolution and
the proliferation of radical political ideologies, new liberals considered economic security
for the poor essential to maintaining the peaceful course of the political and economic
progress of European nations. In Germany, a group of scholars known as “academic
socialists” (Kathedersozialisten) justified government regulation of the economy as a
means of promoting social justice. One of the most respected economists of that period,
Émile de Laveleye, argued that unregulated markets fostered extreme social
differentiation and thus posed a threat to political stability and the advance of freedom in
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Western societies. John Stuart Mill, to whom Laveleye dedicated his most influential
book, endorsed this argument.222
It was in the context of the new liberalism that Kovalevskii criticized Stolypin for his
socially irresponsible agrarian policy, which essentially prescribed economic disaster for
millions of peasants. Urging the government to devise more socially-oriented strategies
of rural development, he pointed to the lesson of the French Revolution which, in his
opinion, could have been prevented if the French monarchy had been more sensitive to
the economic demands of the rural population. In his magisterial four-volume study, The
Origins of Contemporary Democracy (1895-1897), Kovalevskii argued that the failure of
the French ancien régime to resolve the pressing social and economic problems of the
peasantry had led to the outbreak of the French Revolution. The Russian monarchy, he
maintained, was paving the way for the same catastrophic scenario by implementing a
radical land privatization program that would sanction the immiseration of the peasant
masses.
Kovalevskii's analysis of the peasant commune also appears to be remarkably relevant
to contemporary debates about the nature of the peasant economy. Both scholars and
policy-makers continue to debate this issue today, particularly in regard to the ongoing
land reforms in Russia and in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Two major schools of
thought dominate scholarly discourse today. Following Chaianov, James C. Scott and
Teodor Shanin emphasize the predominance of subsistence priorities in the peasant
economy, which they describe as a peculiar type of the so-called “moral economy” with
its own rationality, distinct from the rationality of capitalist market relations. According
to this view, the primary goal of peasants' economic activities is to satisfy the
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consumption needs of the household and to avoid the risks associated with marketoriented production, particularly the risks of specialization and experimentation.223 By
contrast, Samuel L. Popkin and his followers assert that the peasants' economic behavior
is often just as rational as that of capitalist entrepreneurs. In Popkin's opinion, peasants
operate according to capitalist logic because they seek to maximize productivity and
profitability of their labor.224
Kovalevskii's scholarship provides us with evidence that both aspects—subsistence
needs and productivity-maximizing efforts—characterize peasants' economic behavior.
Paradoxically, it took several decades for scholars to recognize the idea of the duality of
the peasant economy. Sadly, Kovalevskii's insights did not contribute to this recognition,
they remained largely ignored in the Soviet period.
The first discussions of the dual nature of the peasant economy appeared in academic
journals devoted to peasant studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. George Dalton, for
example, was one of the first scholars to mention the presence of both subsistence and
market production in peasant economies.225 More recently, scholars have begun
systematic empirical studies of the plurality of economic rationalities and productive
relations within peasant communities around the world. Victoria Bernal, for example, has
found evidence of the intertwining of market and non-market relations in modern African
rural communities. According to her, peasants respond to market conditions by their
involvement in off-farm work, particularly wage work, and participation in food markets.
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Subsistence production, although not driven by the profit motive, becomes increasingly
dependent on the operation of labor and food markets.226 A growing body of literature
suggests that non-market transactions characterize productive exchanges within the
village, while market relations link peasants to the larger economic system of which they
are a part. In light of these contemporary discussions, Kovalevskii's insights appear to be
particularly noteworthy.
Regarding the complexity of peasant society, another important historical parallel
could be made. Although there is no indication that Kovalevskii ever met Ferdinand
Tönnies or was familiar with his works, we can see clear similarities in their visions of
peasant life and culture. Tönnies described pre-industrial communities as dominated by
Gemeinschaft type of relations but also containing elements of Gesellschaft. Likewise,
Kovalevskii demonstrated the coexistence of tradition and collectivism with growing
individualism and modern rationality within the Russian village. This is an important
reminder to those present-day scholars who tend to define societies in the framework of
either the Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft paradigm.227 It should be noted that Kovalevskii
avoided the extremes of such “either-or” thinking and offered a balanced and nuanced
analysis of peasant communities.
Kovalevskii urged scholars to refrain from simplistic interpretations of the peasant
economy and warned them of the dangers of what Esther Kingston-Mann called “strictly
dichotomized thinking”228 and what Robert Allen defined as “agrarian
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fundamentalism.”229 He cautioned that contradistinctions between private and collective
practices, as well as their supposed advantages, might not be as clear-cut as many tended
to think. In the context of the Russian village commune, collective and individualistic
elements complemented rather than contradicted each other.
While the elitist ideas of Auguste Comte encouraged Russian intellectuals and
politicians to assume the role of missionaries to the allegedly “backward” peasants,
Kovalevskii urged them to abandon their intellectual arrogance toward peasants and to
recognize the peasants' capacity and willingness to improve and innovate. Kovalevskii
recognized the civilizing and enlightening mission of intellectual and political elites, but
at the same time he stressed that peasants could actively contribute to social and
economic progress in Russia. The village commune, he believed, was capable of
generating from within itself the impulse to change. He argued for projects of economic
reform that would recognize the significance of the peasants' expertise, as well as
peasants' real—not imagined—interests and needs.
Only recently, historians of Russia have begun to focus their attention on the active
role of the peasantry in shaping rural modernization. Remarkably, Kovalevskii attempted
to draw scholarly attention to this issue more than a century ago. His analysis challenges
us to revise our understanding of the logic and dynamic of social and economic change.
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